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OVER  THE PAST  several  years, a number  of economists  have developed 
what  is called  the "dual  labor  market"  theory.  Much  of this work  has been 
empirical  or descriptive  in nature  and has been heavily  oriented  towards 
the specific  policy  problem  of poverty  and  unemployment.'  The popularity 
of this theory  has been fed by claims  that it is nonneoclassical  if not anti- 
neoclassical  in substance,  and that it could solve certain  empirical  puzzles 
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1. By the dual  literature,  I refer  to the theories  set forth  in the work of, among others, 
Peter Doeringer, Michael Piore, Lester C. Thurow, Bennett Harrison,  Barry F. Blue- 
stone, Thomas Vietorisz,  Howard M. Wachtel,  and Charles  Betsey. This is not meant 
to be a complete  list. Not all of the work of these individuals  falls exclusively  into the 
dual literature  classification.  Some overlaps more traditional  approaches,  while some 
intersects  with the radical paradigm.  No attempt is made here to analyze the radical 
school, since its theoretical  framework  is quite distinct from the dual model. The dis- 
tinction between  the dual and radical  camps, as well as the appropriate  categorization 
of the various authors, parallels David M. Gordon, Thzeories  of Poverty and Under- 
emnploymnent:  Orthzodox,  Radical,  and Dual Labor  Market  Perspectives  (Heath, 1972). 
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in the poverty  and unemployment  data that purportedly  could not be ex- 
plained  by the neoclassical  literature. 
Although  research  on the dual  labor  market  has attracted  considerable 
attention,  from both economists  and policymakers,2  it has not been sub- 
jected  to a detailed  critique  by economists  who have  not themselves  taken 
the  approach.3  Since  the  model  has  been  developed  by a number  of authors, 
each  of whom  has  presented  a unique  view  of the dual  framework,  its inter- 
pretation  is subject  to some confusion.  In addition,  the dualists  have con- 
centrated  on policy  issues  and  have  made  little  attempt  to develop  an  overall 
framework  for their analysis.  The purpose  of this paper  is to attempt  to 
integrate  the disparate  strands  in this  literature  and  to provide  a critique  of 
the dualist  model.  Following  the dualists'  interests,  I have  concentrated  on 
policy-related  problems  rather  than on methodological  concerns. 
The model of the dual labor market  rests on three  general  hypotheses. 
First,  the  economy  contains  two sectors,  a primary  high-wage  and  a second- 
ary low-wage  sector,  and the behavior  of firms  and individuals  in the two 
require  different  theoretical  explanations.  Second,  the important  distinc- 
tion for economic  analysis  is that between  good and bad  jobs rather  than 
between skilled and unskilled  workers.  Third, workers  confined  to the 
secondary  sector develop  a pattern  of job instability,  moving frequently 
among  jobs and into and out of unemployment  and labor  force participa- 
tion. 
Good jobs make  up the primary  sector  of the dual  economy,  while  bad 
jobs and  the workers  frozen  out of the primary  sector  compose  the second- 
ary  sector.  In that  sector  jobs are  sufficiently  plentiful  to employ  all workers, 
but they are  low paying,  unstable,  and generally  unattractive.  Workers  are 
barred  from the primary  sector  not so much  by their own lack of human 
capital  as by institutional  restraints  (such  as discrimination)  and  by a simple 
2. For example,  to an extent unusual for a new set of hypotheses,  it has gained a 
hearing  from congressional  committees.  Its views on labor market  behavior  also provide 
the background  for the employment  and earnings  inadequacy  index, a new measure  of 
labor problems  offered  as an alternative  to the traditional  unemployment  measures  and 
developed by government  and private research economists. See Sar A. Levitan and 
Robert  Taggart  III,  Employment  and  Earnintgs Inadequacy:  A  New  Social  Indicator 
(Johns Hopkins University  Press, 1974). 
3. Exceptions  are the radical  critique  by Gordon, Theories  of Poverty,  pp. 43-52, and 
an analysis of certain aspects of the dual program  by Robert E. Hall, "Prospects  for 
Shifting  the Phillips  Curve  through Manpower  Policy," Brookings  Papers  on Economic 
Activity (3:1971), pp. 659-701. (This publication is referred  to  hereafter as BPEA, 
followed by the date.) Currently,  Glen G. Cain is developing  a critique  of the dual and 
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lack of good jobs. As such, workers  in the secondary  sector suffer  from 
underemployment. 
In analyzing  the primary  market, the dualists  have concentrated  on 
describing  the "internal  labor market,"  a construct  that was originally 
sketched  in the labor  relations  and industrial  engineering  literature  of the 
1950s.  Their  major  hypothesis  is that efficiency  plays only a small  part in 
the internal  labor  market;  thus wage  rates  and  jobs are  distributed  among 
primary  workers  according  to such  factors  as custom  rather  than produc- 
tivity. A second, related,  proposition  is that the number  of primary  or 
skilled  jobs is not responsive  to the relative  availability  of skilled  workers. 
This  has important,  nonneoclassical,  implications  since  it suggests  that ex- 
pansion  in human  capital  may  not lead  to an upgrading  of the  job structure. 
These  issues  are analyzed  in the next section. 
The dual approach  to the secondary  sector  revolves  around  four inter- 
related  hypotheses:  First, it is useful  to dichotomize  the economy  into a 
primary  and a secondary  sector.  Second,  the wage  and  employment  mech- 
anisms  in the secondary  sector  are  distinct  from  those  in the  primary  sector. 
Third,  economic  mobility  between  these  two sectors  is sharply  limited,  and 
hence  workers  in the secondary  sector  are  essentially  trapped  there.  Finally, 
the secondary  sector is marked  by pervasive  underemployment  because 
workers  who could be trained  for skilled  jobs at no more than the usual 
cost are  confined  to unskilled  jobs. In this sense  emphasis  should  be placed 
on good  versus  bad  jobs rather  than  skilled  versus  unskilled  workers.  These 
issues  are explored  in the third  section. 
The dual literature  has concentrated  on the nature  of unemployment 
among  secondary  workers  when  the economy  is prosperous,  arguing  that 
it is structural.  But  it presents  a different  view  of structural  unemployment 
from  that  developed  in the early  1960s.  According  to the dualists,  there  are 
more  than  enough  jobs in the secondary  market,  but they are "bad"  jobs, 
characterized  by poverty  wages  and  dead  ends.  Hence,  the dualists  hypoth- 
esize,  the cause  of the deep  unemployment  in the secondary  sector  is high 
turnover  resulting  from a lack of incentive  for workers  or employers  to 
maintain  stable  employment  relationships.  The  dualist  model  of unemploy- 
ment  is discussed  in the fourth  section. 
The policy prescription  of creating  better  jobs or more "good"  jobs is 
the central  conclusion  of the dual  theory,  and conflicts  with  standard  neo- 
classical  analysis.  According  to the dualists,  the main problem  with the 
labor  market  is the scarcity  of goodjobs,  and  hence,  the crucial  assignment 
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public  sector.4  Policy  tools, alone  or in combination,  are  legislating  higher 
wages  and better  working  conditions  in the private  sector  and increasing 
public  service  employment  specifically  for secondary  workers.  The dualists 
also hypothesize  that aggregate  demand  policies  and manpower  training 
cannot  solve  the underemployment  problem.  They  argue  that  expansion  of 
aggregate  demand  will serve  only to create  more bad  jobs as the primary 
sector  subcontracts  work to the secondary  sector.  Manpower  training,  as 
they see it, is simply unnecessary.  Secondary  workers  have the human 
capital  they  need-what they  lack is access  to good  jobs. The  policy  impli- 
cations  of these  dualist  arguments  are analyzed  in the fifth section. 
A general  hypothesis  threading  through  the literature  is that the dual 
model is nonneoclassical.  Moreover,  dual theorists  and radical  theorists 
seem  to agree  that,  while  their  paradigms  overlap,  they  are  largely  distinct. 
The dual  literature  makes  little  use of the mainstays  of the radical  model- 
for example,  the  class  struggle  and  exploitation.  The  nonneoclassical  claims 
of the various  dual hypotheses  are analyzed  as they arise in the various 
sections. 
As is always  the case, these hypotheses  can be stated and interpreted 
more or less rigidly.  A special  feature  of the literature  on the dual labor 
market  is its strong  policy orientation;  and that orientation  may help to 
explain  the tendency  of many  dualists  to take a relatively  rigid  theoretical 
line. Although  this paper  discusses  a strict  dual  model,  it also assesses  the 
validity  and  novelty  of the model  when  some  of the strong  assumptions  are 
relaxed. 
My view  of the neoclassical  labor  market  model  is broader  than  the text- 
book competitive  case.5 Institutional  arrangements  do exist in the real 
world, and have been acknowledged  even by the mainstays  of applied 
4. The dualists  do support  manpower  training  and aggregate  demand  policies geared 
to lowering unemployment,  but they insist that they are not sufficient to solve the 
structural  problems.  In any case, the novel element  in the dual approach  is its stress on 
creating  more good jobs. 
5. Although  the issue of whether  the dual literature  is nonneoclassical  is definitional, 
there is an important  underlying  question.  In arguing  that their results  are nonneoclas- 
sical, the dualists  take a further  step and assume that no traditional  model can incor- 
porate their institutional  or empirical  findings.  This assumption  allows them to jump 
to their  policy conclusions  on the basis of an incomplete  model of the labor  market.  I ask 
the opposite  question:  Can  a new institutional  or empirical  development  be incorporated 
into a broadened  neoclassical  framework?  In that way, one can make policy statements 
that, although not startling,  rest on a more complete view of the economic system. 
The conclusions,  however,  are different  from those proposed  by the dualists. Michael L.  Wachter  641 
neoclassical  economics,  the Chicago  school.  Indeed,  the classic  text on the 
empirical  impact  of labor  unions  has been written  by H. Gregg  Lewis  and 
the initial  seminal  work on discrimination  was done by Gary  Becker.6  At 
times,  the dual  literature  seems  to imply  that the very  existence  of institu- 
tions such as labor unions or of discrimination  makes the neoclassical 
model irrelevant.  To be sure,  some orthodox  economists  argue  that such 
institutions  have relatively  small  effects;  for example,  while  they  recognize 
that unions  may raise  wages,  they  insist  that the effect  is muted  by the ten- 
dency  of firms  to raise  their  hiring  requirements  in response.  In any case, 
that is not the position taken here, nor is it a necessary  feature  of neo- 
classicism. 
I use the neoclassical  label as a shorthand  definition  for that group of 
economists  who, while  recognizing  the impact  of institutions  and viewing 
the economy  as built of industrial  and demographic  segments,  integrate 
these elements  into labor market  models in which maximizing  behavior 
and  traditional  price  theory  are  central.7  The  lineage  begins  with  the classi- 
cal economists,  Adam Smith  and John Stuart  Mill, and includes  a diverse 
group  of modern  economists  who have  been concerned  with  labor  market 
problems,  such as John  T. Dunlop, R. A. Gordon,  Charles  C. Holt, and 
Albert  Rees.8  My terminology  thus contrasts  with  that of others,  who de- 
6. H. G. Lewis, Unioniism  and Relative Wages  in thze  United  States: An Empirical 
Study  (University  of Chicago  Press,  1963);  Gary  S. Becker,  The  Economics  of Discrimina- 
tion (University  of Chicago  Press, 1957). 
7. Most labor market  analysis over the past several  years has utilized one of three 
modes of structuring  the model.  The continuous-queue  model is perhaps  the most widely 
utilized  in theoretical  work, especially  in the search  literature,  and posits the existence 
of a continuum  of workers  and firms. 
In empirical  work, segmented  models  tend to dominate.  The effect of segmentation  is 
to interrupt  the continuum.  Studies  that place  firms  and workers  in discrete  geographical, 
industrial,  occupational,  skill, race, sex, or age categories essentially  are utilizing seg- 
mented markets.  The advantage  of segmented  markets  over a continuous queue is that 
the former  saves on scarce  or unavailable  data. Segmented  models  are most useful  where 
the discrete  segments  are actually  important  dividing  markers. 
Two-sector models have appeared in both theoretical and applied work. In this 
research  the dichotomization  is almost  invariably  viewed  as an abstraction  from  a multi- 
sector world. One distinguishing  feature of the dual literature  is its serious attempt to 
describe  the labor market  as a two-sector  market.  Although some segmentation  is per- 
mitted within each of the two sectors,  the boundaries  between  the two are quite rigid. 
8. For example,  Adam Smith, The Wealth  of Nations  (Modern  Library,  1937), espe- 
cially Book 1, Chap. 8, "Of the Wages  of Labour,"  and Chap. 10, "Of Wages  and Profit 
in the different  Employments  of Labour  and Stock"; and John Stuart  Mill, Principles  of 
Political  Economy  (Appleton,  1877).  The roots in antiquity  of the dual  and radical  models 642  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
fine the neoclassical  position as focusing on competitive  labor market 
models  that are undisturbed  by institutional  realities.  Although  this paper 
is aimed at the dualist  literature,  I hope to make clear that that model 
implicitly  provides  a useful  critique  of the competitive  labor  market  model. 
I will distinguish  among  (1) the "dual"  model, (2) the competitive  model 
that rules out institutional  barriers  and industrial  and demographic  seg- 
mentation  and in which  human  capital  considerations  are dominant,  and 
(3) the neoclassical  model as defined  above. 
The  Primary  Sector 
The central  hypothesis  of the dual  model  is the existence  of two sectors 
of the economy;  a high-wage  primary  and a low-wage  secondary  sector. 
The  former  is composed  of industries  or firms-or, more  precisely,  of their 
components-that have internal  labor  markets. 
STRUCTURE 
It is generally  agreed,  by both dualists  and neoclassical  economists,  that 
the internal  labor  market  consists  of a set of structured  employment  rela- 
tionships  within  a firm,  embodying  a set of rules,  formal  (as in unionized 
firms)  or informal,  that  govern  each  job and  their  interrelationships.9  These 
are stressed  by Sherwin  Rosen in his book review  of Gordon's Theories  of Poverty  and 
Underemployment  in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82 (March/April  1974), pp. 437- 
39. The  current  modeling  of segmented  markets  in a neoclassical  model  is carried  furthest 
by Charles  C. Holt and his associates  at the Urban Institute.  See, for example,  Charles 
C. Holt and others, The Unzemployment-Inflation  Dilemma: A Manpower Solution (Urban 
Institute,  1971). 
9. The workings of the internal labor market were studied intensively  in the late 
1940s and 1950s by researchers  in industrial  relations  and labor economics. Although 
much of the literature  was concerned  with the impact of industrial  unions, a new phe- 
nomenon  at the time,  the issues  involving  structured  labor  markets  were  not new and had 
been  studied  in a nonunion  context as well. See, for example,  Clark  Kerr, "The Balkan- 
ization  of  Labor  Markets,"  in  Labor Mobility  and Economic  Opportunity, Essays  by 
E. Wight  Bakke and others (Technology  Press of MIT and Wiley, 1954); and John T. 
Dunlop,  "The  Task of Contemporary  Wage  Theory,"  in George  W. Taylor  and Frank  C. 
Pierson (eds.), New Concepts in JVY'age  Determination (McGraw-Hill,  1957). A theoretical 
foundation  for the study of internal  markets  was provided  by Gary S. Becker's  classic 
study,  Human  Capital  (Columbia  University  Press  for the National Bureau  of Economic Michael L.  Wachter  643 
rules, for example, cover job content and wages, opportunities on the pro- 
motion ladder, and grievance  procedures. A complex employment relation- 
ship has developed primarily because of the elaboration of tasks that are 
specific to a job and hence require specific training, often acquired on the 
job. Because of these institutional realities the competitive model's descrip- 
tion of a labor market based on demand and supply for each job does not 
apply. Most jobs are unique and lack an external market. Hence, the labor 
market is far from a bourse. New workers are used principally to fill entry 
jobs, while most higher-level positions are filled by promotion from within. 
Ports of entry are likely to be open to the unskilled, and to those who have 
the lowest semiskills, craft-oriented skills, and certain managerial and staff 
talents. As a consequence of specific training, workers already in a firm 
have an advantage over outsiders, and in a sense, enjoy a degree of monop- 
oly power over their jobs. At the same time, the firm's potential control 
over the worker also grows, since the worker's specific training is most 
worthwhile to his current employer. 
The dualist interpretation of the internal labor market is open to dis- 
agreement. One general claim it makes is that, although efficiency factors 
are relevant to managerial decisionmaking in the internal labor market, 
they are not dominant.'0 More specifically, they claim that productivity or 
a high wage adheres to the job rather than to the worker; that the wage 
structure  is dominated not by efficiency  considerations but rather  by custom 
and habit; and that good jobs go to people who are already with the firm by 
methods of promotion that largely reflect institutional arrangements.  Con- 
sequently, the distribution of jobs and income in the primary sector is not 
dictated by ability and human capital. In addition, the dualists argue that 
the number of jobs in the primary sector is unresponsive to the availability 
of good workers, and buttress that claim with the empirical finding that it is 
invariant with respect to the relative factor price of good workers.11  Apart 
from that issue, however, the dual literature contains little empirical work 
on the primary sector. 
Research,  1964).  The industrial  relations  and human  capital literature  have been pulled 
together  by Peter  B. Doeringer  and Michael  J. Piore, Internal  Labor  Markets  and Manl- 
power  Analysis  (Heath, 1971),  to form an overall  analysis of the internal  labor market. 
10. The dual position on the primary  sector is developed  largely by Doeringer  and 
Piore, Internal Labor Markets. 
11. Michael  J. Piore, "The Impact of the Labor Market  upon the Design and Selec- 
tion of Productive  Techniques  within the Manufacturing  Plant," Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  Vol. 82 (November 1968),  pp. 602-20. 644  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
The dualists do not propose any motives that substitute for efficiency. 
This is a serious gap in their analysis, especially given their policy orienta- 
tion. It leaves them unable to predict the response of high-wage firms to 
various policy programs aimed at creating more "good" jobs. 
I take a different  approach and view the internal labor market as an effi- 
ciency-oriented institutional response to  the market forces generated by 
idiosyncratic  jobs and the technology of on-the-job training.'2 
The efficiency argument can be summarized in the following manner: 
Idiosyncratic jobs that require specific training present a pervasive prob- 
lem of bilateral monopoly.  An  important purpose of the internal labor 
market is to neutralize the issue so that it does not absorb the resources of 
the firm to the detriment of both workers and management. Accomplishing 
this aim involves minimizing bargaining and turnover costs; encouraging 
workers to exercise their specific knowledge; and ensuring that investments 
of idiosyncratic types, which constitute a potential source of job monopoly, 
are undertaken without risk of exploitation by either side. Contrary to the 
dualist argument, important features of the employment relationship en- 
courage efficiency:  first, although firms attach wage rates to individual  jobs 
and not to workers, they do so to reduce bargaining costs, and to further 
the proper functioning of the organizational structure; second, except for 
entry jobs,  the firm fills jobs by promoting meritorious workers through 
the organizational structure  as they acquire training. High-wage  jobs do not 
make high-wage workers; rather, the internal market screens workers and 
places the good ones in good jobs. The differences between the dualist ap- 
proach and the efficiency argument are discussed below. 
THE INTERNAL  LABOR  MARKET 
Internal wage structure. Doeringer and Piore stress the role of such fac- 
tors as community wage surveys, individual merit ratings, and job evalua- 
tion  schemes in determining the wages attached to  particular jobs.  The 
surveys and ratings are clearly neoclassical forces; the former measure 
competitive market forces in general and the latter weigh the value of the 
individual worker. Doeringer and Piore, however, choose to interpret the 
12. The efficiency  position is discussed in greater detail in Oliver E. Williamson, 
Michael  L. Wachter,  and Jeffrey  E. Harris,  "Understanding  the Employment  Relation: 
The Analysis  of Idiosyncratic  Exchange"  (University  of Pennsylvania,  1974; processed), 
forthcoming  in Bell Journal  of Economics  and Management  Science. Michael L.  Wachter  645 
job evaluation scheme as not strongly influenced by efficiency considera- 
tions. Their view is that although market forces impose lower limits on the 
wages in certain jobs,  management has substantial discretion in setting 
rates. Essentially, an infinite number of equilibrium internal wage struc- 
tures exist, and efficiency does not determine the one that prevails. 
The efficiency approach agrees that the firm has considerable flexibility 
in setting its relative or internal wage structure so long as the average wage 
is sufficiently  high to attract the necessary labor supply. The external mar- 
ket does impose some constraints on relative wages, because the firm hires 
workers in several generally distinct occupational labor markets. For ex- 
ample, it may hire unskilled workers to  do janitorial work, semiskilled 
workers to operate machinery (and perhaps eventually to be promoted and 
trained as skilled operators), skilled craftsmen (such as electricians),  clerical 
workers, and managerial personnel. This, however, does  not  force the 
firm's wages for entry  jobs to equal those elsewhere; it requires  merely that 
the expected discounted value of the job-earnings stream, including pro- 
motion possibilities, be high enough to attract the necessary workers.'3 
In general, then, the competitive market does not determine any individ- 
ual wage rate within the firm (except for an entry job that is not part of a 
promotion ladder). Even so, firms  cannot set their relative wages arbitrarily. 
As the literature on job evaluation schemes emphasizes, they are designed 
to advance intrafirm efficiency. For example, the wage structure attaches 
sufficient wage increases to promotions to make them sought after. Au- 
thority relationships are cemented by paying a worker more than those he 
supervises.  As Meij summarizes, "the internal wage-structure  [is] the value 
dimension of the organization-structure."'4 
13. More specifically,  the workers  need to find the wage attractive.  Thus, a firm  that 
had a reputation  for good promotion possibilities  could pay a lower entry wage. The 
difficulty  in communicating  its wage structure,  as well as its promotion  ladders, to a 
general,  external  labor market  is an important  reason  why a firm  tends to hire through 
referrals from its current workers. Established workers can transmit the complex 
employment  relationship  to potential new workers much less expensively  than other 
advertising  methods  can. 
14. J. L. Meij, "Wage-Structure  and Organization-Structure,"  in J. L. Meij (ed.), 
Internal  Wage  Structure  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1963),  p. 115. Actually, much of 
the analysis  of the dualists  can be reinterpreted  in an efficiency  context. Piore describes 
the role of sociological factors in determining  the interactions  of workers with each 
other  and with management.  Although  Piore considers  his model development  nonneo- 
classical, a more accurate statement is that these factors have not traditionally  been 
modeled by neoclassical  economists. A profit maximizer  setting up an internal wage 
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In this context, it is important to determine whether the internal wage 
structure  is responsive to government pressure. Could attempts to equalize 
incomes focus on internal differentials?  Thurow and Lucas suggest a policy 
of altering the "sociological judgments about 'fair' wage differentials."'15 
But a number of problems would limit the effectiveness of this approach. 
First, job evaluation schemes have the strongest impact within promotion 
ladders. Although a lower-skilled entry worker might eventually rise into 
management, the promotion ladders for blue-collar production workers 
and management tend to be separate. Each has its own entry  jobs, drawing 
on distinct external  labor markets. Hence, one could alter the relative wages 
of  different grades of  machine operators, but the existence  of  separate 
markets for broader categories of workers such as semiskilled workers and 
managers interferes with attempts by firms to  alter their relative wages. 
Second, even within promotion ladders, job evaluation plans attempt to 
weigh various factors so as to promote internal efficiency. If semiskilled 
helpers earned only a little less than their skilled supervisors they would 
have little incentive to absorb the training that provides the firm with its 
skilled blue-collar workers. These issues are at the core of the interpretation 
of the internal wage structure. Internal relative wages may serve a purpose 
even though a perfectly  competitive market does not determine  each wage.'6 
The "sociological" factors of Piore and Thurow are essentially the "taste" 
variables of the efficiency model that determine the attitudes of workers 
toward training and the nonpecuniary aspects of jobs.  Custom, inertia, 
and attitudes must be weighed in establishing an efficient wage structure.'7 
"Fragments  of a 'Sociological'  Theory of Wages,"  in American  Economic  Association, 
Papers  and Proceedintgs of  the Eighty-fifth  Anznual  AMeeting,  1972  (American Economic 
Review,  Vol. 63, May 1973),  pp. 377-84. 
15. Lester C. Thurow and Robert E.  B. Lucas, "The American Distribution of 
Income: A Structural  Problem,"  A Study Prepared  for the Use of the Joint Economic 
Committee,  92 Cong. 2 sess. (1972), p. 44. 
16. The importance  of intrafirm  wage differentials  in encouraging  workers  to accept 
training  and promotions  is stressed  in the literature  on wage structures  in communist 
countries.  The efficiency  orientation  of the internal  labor market  has a long tradition  in 
this literature.  For a western  interpretation,  see Harold  Lydall,  The  Structure  of Earnlings 
(Oxford  University  Press, 1968). 
17. In some cases payment  by result  is instituted  as a direct  way of providing  incen- 
tives. These schemes  have become somewhat  less popular  recently  because of the cost 
of administering  them and their disruptive  effects if they are not closely managed. 
Demoralization  can easily arise from initially successful  plans as a consequence  of the 
slow but continuous  technological  change that alters the structure  of jobs. Promotions 
can serve  the same purpose  of providing  a pecuniary  advantage  to superior  performance 
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Internal mobility. Dualists and more traditional economists agree that 
the internal  labor markets of the high-wage sector assure that most upward 
mobility will be accomplished through internal promotions rather than by 
changing firms. The shifts among firms disproportionately involve young 
workers who have not  yet advanced on the internal promotion ladder. 
Once a worker has mounted a ladder, moving to  another firm becomes 
costly: it means losing his place on the ladder, since firms generally hire 
only at the entry rung. 
The promotion ladder has important functions in an efficient internal 
labor market that are neglected by the dualists, who view promotions as 
dominated by seniority and by institutional and social arrangements in 
general. First, it serves to reward meritorious performance and to reduce 
turnover. Although almost all jobs carry a salary range within which raises 
are possible, it is necessarily limited, and hence the opportunity to promote 
workers to higher-ranking  jobs  is desirable. As  Becker and others have 
pointed out, specifically trained workers must be paid more than their op- 
portunity costs to  other firms in order to discourage quits. As a worker 
moves up a promotion ladder, the gap between his opportunity wage, at 
the entry point of an alternative firm, and his actual wage widens. 
A second advantage of promotion ladders is that workers may acquire 
not only specific information about their own jobs, but also specific training 
for higher-level  jobs in the firm. Simple physical proximity, or the oppor- 
tunities provided by the lines of authority within a firm to observe the job 
content of those higher on the ladder, abets this process. In other words, 
training for advancement is a joint product with the firm's output as work- 
ers perform their jobs. 
Promotion ladders also provide a screening mechanism within the firm. 
That the performance of a worker on the job, rather  than straight seniority, 
is important in promotions is illustrated in a recent study by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, which found that fewer than 2 percent of workers were 
covered in major collective bargaining agreements  in which promotion was 
based on seniority alone.18 Ability and performance are likely to be even 
more dominant in the nonunion sector and in clerical and professional  jobs. 
Recent theoretical literature on screening  has stressed that, because both 
workers and firms possess only imperfect information, the wage distribu- 
tion will depend on the distribution of information as well as on native 
18.  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements: Senior- 
ity in Promotion and Transfer Provisions, Bulletin  1425-11 (1970), p. 5. 648  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
ability, schooling, and the like.19  The arbitrary  nature of any wage distribu- 
tion appears to support the spirit of the dual model. Whereas the dualists 
(and some of the analysts of screening) argue that multiple equilibria result 
from the operation of the internal labor market, I disagree. In my view, an 
important purpose of the internal labor market is to provide a continuous 
screening  function. Credentials  acquired elsewhere are evaluated at the hir- 
ing point; but thereafter, in a technology that requires specific and on-the- 
job training, an internal labor market may well be the most efficient appa- 
ratus for collecting and analyzing data on individual performance. This 
interpretation  has three aspects: First, if screens, such as education, did not 
provide useful information, they would eventually be discarded.20  Second, 
statistical discrimination  is not ruled out since employers are likely to econ- 
omize on costly information. As long as errors in the hiring process can be 
rectified ex post, however, firms have less incentive to establish absolute 
entry bars. Besides the outright firing of workers who were hired in error, 
firms can minimize losses by halting those workers on the promotion lad- 
der. Third, as a consequence of sequential screening in internal labor mar- 
kets and reliance on a number of different  tests, workers have less tendency 
to overinvest in order to surmount a particular barrier. 
THE FIRM S WAGE  RELATIVE TO EXTERNAL  WAGES 
Jobs in the primary sector are good jobs in part because they pay high 
wages. But why do some firms pay more than the competitive wage? In the 
dualist model, the essence of good jobs appears to be that they offer specific 
training. High wages, promotion possibilities, and other desirable  attributes 
seem to accompany this feature. In the dualist framework,  however, specific 
training alone  cannot  account  for  the  high  wages.  Given  the  dualists' 
characterization of the internal labor market as inefficient, their primary 
market firms must wield market power. One would expect a positive cor- 
relation between firms with market power and firms that utilize specific 
training for blue-collar workers. A  large investment in specific training 
19.  Michael  Spence,  "Job Market  Signaling,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  Vol. 
87 (August 1973),  pp. 355-74; and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Theories  of Discrimination  and 
Economic  Policy," in George M. von Furstenberg  and others  (eds.), Patterns  of Racial 
Discrimination, Vol.  2, Employment and Income (Heath,  1974). 
20. This discussion  excludes  screens  consciously  designed  to discriminate  against  cer- 
tain types of workers.  It also does not deny the possible differences  between  social and 
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involves a large investment in human capital. Furthermore, the type of 
specific training that Doeringer, Piore, and others discuss is related to the 
use of extensive physical capital. Consequently, these firms have high fixed 
costs and are likely to  be in concentrated industries that have product 
market power and are more easily unionized. 
Although market power may be pervasive in the primary sector of the 
dualist model, this does not mean that all high-wage jobs and all jobs with 
specific training are associated with market power. As Hall,  Okun, and 
Ulman-and  Doeringer and Piore-have  argued, firms with specifically 
trained workers can trade off high wages against saving in heavy turnover 
costs.21 Unit labor costs are unchanged so that the competitive position of 
the firm is not lost. Consequently, along with market power, specific train- 
ing can be a source of high wages.22 
THE  SUPPLY  OF GOOD  JOBS IN  THE PRIMARY  SECTOR 
Are good jobs  scarce given the supply of good workers? The dualists 
seem to argue that the failure of high-wage firms to emphasize efficiency 
itself causes a scarcity of good jobs. The major empirical work in the dual 
interpretation of the primary sector claims to find support for this view. 
When Piore surveyed businessmen about the factors that influence their 
decisions on technology design, they indicated that relative factor prices 
for various skill categories of labor were not important.23  Given the nature 
of the study, this finding should not be surprising.  The results, however, do 
not imply that the neoclassical price mechanism is not working. First, with- 
in the internal wage structure, relative wages are controlled by the firm 
itself and set by job evaluation schemes. Consequently, within limits, firms 
21. Robert  E. Hall, "Why  Is the Unemployment  Rate So High at Full Employment?" 
BPEA (3:1970), pp. 369-402; Arthur  M. Okun, "Upward  Mobility in a High-Pressure 
Economy," BPEA (1:1973), pp. 207-52; and Lloyd Ulman, "Labor Mobility and the 
Industrial  Wage Structure  in the Postwar United States," Quarterly  Journal of Eco- 
nomics,  Vol. 79 (February  1965),  pp. 73-97. 
22. To what extent  these high wages represent  a wage premium  may be disputed  by 
a strict "human capitalist." He would argue that the lifetime earnings  stream of the 
specifically  trained, properly discounted  using the high-risk  premium  associated with 
specific  training,  equals the lifetime  competitive  earnings  stream.  Hence, the wage pre- 
mium is actually a competitive  return on a risky investment.  See Donald 0.  Parsons, 
"Specific  Human Capital:  An Application  to Quit Rates and Layoff Rates,"  Journal  of 
Political  Economy,  Vol. 80 (November/December  1972),  pp. 1120-43. 
23. Piore, "Design and Selection." 650  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
should not be constrained  by relative  wages in their decisionmaking. Second, 
even if firms  looked to the external market, relative  factor prices for broadly 
categorized labor skills change very slowly over time. Hence, factor prices 
should have a noticeable impact on particular firms only in the long run 
and would not be cited in a business survey. Third, all of the arguments in 
the famous Machlup-Lester debate on whether firms maximize profits are 
relevant here.24 
I would argue that good jobs are scarce, relative to a Pareto optimum, 
but that this inefficiency results from factors long recognized in the neo- 
classical model  and not  from the dualist type  of  inefficiencies. Market 
power-whether  in unions or in oligopolies-results  in a socially inefficient 
undersupply  of good jobs. High wages that are not offset by saving in turn- 
over costs reduce the output of the primary sector (and hence the derived 
demand for good jobs) and generate a substitution toward capital and away 
from skilled labor. Also,  as Becker has explained, imperfections inherent 
in the labor market result in underinvestment in specific training. Since 
workers cannot sign voluntary indenture contracts, investment in specific 
training is necessarily more risky than investment in physical capital. The 
result  is a discrepancy  between private and social returns  to specific training. 
The Secondary  Labor  Market 
The dual literature on employment in the secondary market has concen- 
trated on four hypotheses: First, there actually is a secondary market that 
pays lower wages than a primary market. Second, its wage determination 
24. For the genesis  of the debate,  see Richard  A. Lester,  "Shortcomings  of Marginal 
Analysis  for Wage-Employment  Problems,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 36 (March 
1946), pp. 63-82; and Fritz Machlup, "Marginal  Analysis and Empirical  Research," 
American  Economic  Review, Vol. 36 (September  1946), pp. 519-54. The controversy 
elicited  comments  from other authors  and the debate  continued  for several  years  in the 
same journal. Thurow and Lucas, "Distribution of Income," is also relevant here. 
Actually this study is open to two interpretations:  first, that formal education has no 
market  value so that it produces  no abundance  of skilled workers;  second, and related 
to the Piore argument,  that although education does create good workers, firms are 
unresponsive  to relative factor availabilities.  In either case, the job structure  is fixed. 
The Thurow  and Lucas  evidence  is indirect,  however,  and shows only that the narrow- 
ing of the distribution  of education  among workers  since World War II has not been 
accompanied  by a narrowing  of the distribution  of income. Other  interpretations  could 
explain  this result  without  resorting  to the arguments  that education  has no value or that 
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process  differs  from  that in the primary  market,  especially  by ignoring  the 
major  differences  in human  capital  among  workers.  Third,  as a consequence 
of institutional  barriers  on the demand  side,  there  is little  mobility  between 
the two sectors.  Fourth, underemployment  is a pervasive  characteristic 
of the secondary  market.  These  issues  are discussed  in sequence  below. 
THE STRUCTURE  OF THE SECONDARY  MARKET 
The secondary  market  consists  of firms  with relatively  undeveloped  in- 
ternal  markets  and  workers  with  low wages.  The  firm  has  many  entry  points 
and few jobs are filled  by promotions  from within.  Firms in this sector 
generally  pay low wages  and are largely  in the service  and wholesale  and 
retail trade sectors.  Low-wage  firms  can be found in any broad sector, 
however,  including  manufacturing. 
The  secondary  sector  is distinctive  because,  in part,  it employs  more  than 
its share of minority  workers,  teenagers,  and children.25  Firms in this 
sector also provide little specific or on-the-job  training  and relatively 
limited  possibilities  for career  advancement.  These  limitations  reduce  the 
worker's  incentive  to remain  on the  job or to perform  exceptionally  well. 
His current  wage, unlikely  to be significantly  improved  by promotions,  is 
not greatly  different  from the opportunity  wage in other  firms.  Similarly, 
the secondary  employer  is less reluctant  to lay off a worker  since he has 
made  no real  investment  in his training.  Hence,  "workers  in the secondary 
sector, relative  to those in the primary  sector, exhibit greater  turnover, 
higher  rates of lateness  and absenteeism,  more insubordination,  and ... 
more. . . petty  theft  and  pilferage."  More  specifically,  "high  levels  of turn- 
over  and  frictional  unemployment  may  be taken  as the salient  characteristic 
of the secondary  market."26 
WAGE  DETERMINATION 
Wage  determination  has a micro aspect  in fixing  the wages  paid to in- 
dividuals  and a macro  aspect  in setting  the wage rate  in the sector or in- 
25. In the Becker terminology, these are the employers with low discrimination 
coefficients.  In the Bergmann  model, these are the "crowded"  sectors. See Barbara  R. 
Bergmann,  "The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination  in Employment,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  Vol. 79 (March/April 1971),  pp. 294-313. 
26. Doeringer  and Piore, Internal  Labor  Markets,  pp. 165-66. 652  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
dustry  over  time.  The  dualist  model  has more  to say about  the former  than 
it does about  the latter. 
With  respect  to individual  wages,  the dualists'  primary  hypothesis  is that 
a bipolarization  of the  labor  market  exists  and  is analytically  or empirically 
a useful concept. Segmentation  may exist within each category  of jobs, 
especially  in the primary  sector,  but not between  the two sectors.  Unfor- 
tunately,  the dual literature  does not provide  an operational  definition  of 
good and  bad  jobs so that an agreed-upon  empirical  dichotomization  does 
not exist.  A data  problem  with  classifying  firms  is that firms  and  industries 
that are principally  in the high-wage  sector  may also be employers  in the 
secondary  markets.  This  apart,  the distribution  of industries  by earnings  in 
the United States  plainly  shows  no dichotomy  and, in fact, is reasonably 
close  to a normal  distribution.  The  distribution  of workers  by earnings  also 
shows  no evidence  of bipolarity.27  A simple  analysis  of wage  distributions, 
however,  is not a fair  test of bipolarization.  More  relevant  are  the attempts 
to dichotomize  the job structure  according  to wages, but also a host of 
variables  reflecting  a job or individual  characteristics.  Even these results 
are mixed. In addition,  the null hypothesis  in all cases is that there is a 
continuum  of  jobs. This  may  be a test of a strict,  linear,  competitive  human 
capital  model,  but it is not a satisfactory  test of the neoclassical  model  that 
recognizes  demographic  and industrial  segmentation.28 
Whether  the dualists  believe  in a strict dichotomy  is unclear.  On the 
surface  it makes  an expositional  and  rallying  point,  effective  and  dramatic. 
On the other  hand,  researchers,  including  some dualists,  obviously  take it 
seriously  enough to test for its presence.  Whatever  their attachment  to 
27. Data from the special  Survey  of Economic Opportunity  studies  in 1966  and 1967 
by the Bureau of the Census form uniformly  single-peak  distributions  for whites and 
nonwhites  by urban  location. Furthermore,  combining  the separate  categories-subur- 
ban ring,  central-city  poverty  area, and rest of central  city-also  results  in single-peaked 
distributions.  See Bennett Harrison,  Education,  Trainiing  and the Urban  Ghetto  (Johns 
Hopkins University  Press, 1972). 
28. See, for example,  Arthur  J. Alexander,  "Income,  Experience,  and the Structure 
of Internal  Labor Markets,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol. 88 (February  1974), 
pp. 63-85; Paul James Andrisani, An Empirical  Analysis of the Dual Labor Market 
Theory  (Ph.D. dissertation,  Ohio State University,  1973);  Ruth Fabricant  Lowell, "The 
Dual Labor Market  in New York City" (paper  presented  at Human Resources  Admin- 
istration's  Welfare  Research  Conference,  New York City, December  1, 1973;  processed); 
and Paul Osterman,  "An Empirical  Study,of Labor Market Segmentation,"  Industrial 
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the idea, their policy views are influenced  by the strict  dual model. For 
example,  their suggestion  of high-wage  public service  jobs for secondary 
workers  is relatively  easy  to justify  when  the alternative  is only "bad"  jobs. 
In a more finely segmented  market,  however,  it would involve  jumping 
secondary  workers  over a broad  stratum  of jobs, and would  raise  serious 
issues  of horizontal  and vertical  equity. 
High-wage  and low-wage  sectors  exist, but dichotomization  should  be 
used  only as a simplifying  device.  Hereafter,  the dual  terminology  is main- 
tained,  but only for expositional  purposes. 
If bipolarization  indeed  exists,  are the two sectors  governed  by distinct 
processes  of wage  determination?  The dualists  argue  that human  capital  is 
largely  irrelevant  to individual  wages  in the secondary  sector.  Employers  in 
this sector, anticipating  high turnover,  hire workers  without  much prior 
screening,  and  provide  little  subsequent  on-the-job  training.  Hence,  within 
the sector,  individual  wages  are  not a function  of the personal  characteris- 
tics of the worker.  Moreover,  because  promotion  is rare and high-wage 
employment  impossible  to find,  secondary  workers  exhibit  a flat profile  of 
earnings  across  age groups. 
Clearly,  the wage processes  in the two sectors  differ  markedly  in their 
institutional  arrangements.  The  wages  of individual  workers  in the primary 
sector are determined  by the workings  of the highly structured  internal 
labor  market,  with the mechanism  of supply  and demand  in the external 
market  operative  only at a distance. 
The dualist  argument  that  the two markets  have  different  wage  processes 
because  the primary  sector  rewards  human  capital,  whereas  the secondary 
sector  does  not, is more  open  to question.  Perhaps  both sectors  obey  tradi- 
tional laws, but have different  parameters.  To put it another  way, alter- 
native  job evaluation  schemes  in the primary  sector  give different  weights 
to various  worker  characteristics-that  is, "skill"  is a multidimensional 
array.  This  proposition  is already  accepted  to some  extent  by the inclusion 
in both  the dual  and  neoclassical  models  of years  of education  and  age  (as a 
proxy for on-the-job  training)  as variables  reflecting  human capital.  But 
other  variables  in the skill array,  such as quality  of schooling  and manual 
dexterity,  are omitted  because  they cannot be measured;  hence the co- 
efficients  on the human  capital  terms  may be biased  and any scalar  mea- 
sure  of skill is severely  limited  and incomplete. 
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equations  to test for the existence  of alternative  wage  processes  in the dual 
labor  markets.29  They  find  that "demand  variables,"  such as industry  and 
occupation  of workers,  are  the most important  explanatory  variables  even 
after  "supply  effects"  such as education,  job tenure,  age, and the like are 
included.  Although  they provide  interesting  empirical  information,  these 
studies  hardly  test the dualist  model. Their  view of the neoclassical  wage 
model  is a straw  man in that it consists  merely  of the relationship  between 
wages  and  years  of education.  This  type  of equation  has been  employed  by 
some  who follow  the human  capital  approach  to estimate  returns  to educa- 
tion,  but  it is most  often  utilized  when  additional  variables  are  not available. 
Indeed,  multivariate  supply-and-demand  models  of wages,  of the type  esti- 
mated  by the dualists,  have  been  a staple  of neoclassical  economists  for the 
past  twenty  years.  In these  models  demand  variables  are  usually  viewed  as 
representing  union or oligopoly  power.30  The results  are  similar,  although 
the rankings  of the supply  and demand  effects  are sometimes  reversed. 
In general,  whether  supply  or demand  effects  tend  to dominate  depends 
largely  on the richness  of the set of independent  variables  (and  the specific 
sample  period).  A persistent  problem  with  the human  capital  hypothesis  is 
the inability  to measure  and  include  in wage  equations  the quality  of educa- 
tion as well as the quantity.  For example,  ghetto  schools  are generally  re- 
garded  as worse  than  other  schools,  but attempts  to quantify  the difference 
have  met with  little success.31  While  measures  of on-the-job  training  exist, 
they  are  simplistic.  Age or  job tenure  can hardly  be expected  to provide  an 
accurate  proxy  for  job training.  Demand  variables  may  serve  as a proxy  for 
some of these  inadequately  specified  human  capital  variables. 
Consequently,  the stress  on demand  variables  does not distinguish  the 
dual  model  from  more  traditional  views  of the labor  market.  Furthermore, 
the significance  of such  variables  for policies  addressed  to the plight  of the 
29. Howard M. Wachtel  and Charles  Betsey,  "Employment  at Low Wages,"  Review 
of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 54 (May 1972), pp. 121-29; and Barry  F. Bluestone, 
"Economic  Theory,  Economic  Reality,  and the Fate of the Poor,"  in Harold  L. Sheppard 
and others  (eds.), The  Political  Economy  of Public  Service  Employment  (Heath, 1972). 
30. An example  is Leonard  W. Weiss, "Concentration  and Labor Earnings,"  Amer- 
ican  Economic  Review,  Vol. 56 (March  1966),  pp. 96-117. This article  also has references 
to earlier  studies. 
31. On the quality issue in segregated  schools, see, for example,  the Supreme  Court 
decision of 1954 in Brown  v. Board  of Education  (347 U.S. 483). The importance  of the 
quality of education is discussed  by Finis Welch, "Education  and Racial Discrimina- 
tion," in Orley Ashenfelter  and Albert Rees (eds.), Discrimination  in Labor Markcets 
(Princeton  University  Press, 1973). Michael L.  Wachter  655 
low-wage  worker  is unclear.  For example,  they do not guide  policymakers 
in choosing  among  removing  the restrictions  in the primary  sector, sub- 
sidizing  specific  training,  or imposing  new  restrictions,  such  as higher  mini- 
mum  wages,  on the secondary  sector. 
Some  of the  more  recent  studies  of the  dual  hypotheses  identified  primary 
and secondary  jobs according  to certain  job characteristics  and then used 
regression  equations  to test the similarity  of the wage determination  pro- 
cesses  in the two sectors.32  In general  they find  that the wage  equation  for 
the secondary  market  is somewhat  different  from  that which  describes  the 
primary  sector.  In particular,  human  capital,  measured  by years  of educa- 
tion, seems  to be less significant  for wages  in the secondary  sector.  These 
results  are  meaningful  as far as they go, but they are  marred  by the afore- 
mentioned  problem  of representing  the human  capital  array  by a single 
variable  such as years of education.  For workers  at the bottom of the 
educational  achievement  distribution,  quality  of education  may be espe- 
cially  significant,  in part  because  the quantity  of education  may  depend  on 
state  laws.  Another  serious  problem,  however,  is that  truncating  the sample 
into primary  and secondary  sectors  biases the human  capital  coefficients 
toward  zero as a result  of adverse  selection.  The secondary  sector  is com- 
posed  of those  who "did  not make  it," and  contains  the great  bulk  of those 
with  low education  as well  as those  who did  not succeed  in translating  their 
higher education  into higher incomes. Clearly,  combining  these groups 
suggests  a low rate  of return  to education.33  Finally,  the parameter  of the 
proxy  variable  for experience-the age of the worker-may also be biased 
downward.  Whereas  all workers  accumulate  age  at the  same  rate,  the  rate  of 
accumulation  of experience  or training  differs  systematically  among in- 
dustries. 
A seemingly  important  contention  of the dualists  is that the very con- 
centration  of poverty  in certain  segments  of the population  is proof that 
a nonneoclassical  secondary  sector exists. For example, Vietorisz and 
Harrison  argue  that "when  bad jobs are found to be so widespread  that 
perhaps  60 percent  of workers  in the inner  city fail to earn  enough  to sup- 
port  a family  at even  minimum  levels  of decency,  conventional  explanations 
32. See note 28 above. 
33. This point was suggested  to me by Glen Cain. See, for example,  Glen G. Cain  and 
Harold W. Watts, "Toward  a Summary  and Synthesis  of the Evidence,"  in Cain and 
Watts (eds.), Income  Maintenance  and Labor  Supply:  Econometric  Studies  (Markham, 
1973). 656  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
Table  1. Low-Income  Families,  by Number  of Earners  and  Work 
Experience  of Head,  1959, 1963, 1969,  and  1973 
Numbers in thousands 
Number  of 
earners  and  1959  1963  1969  1973 
work 
experience  Ntumber  Percenta  Number  Percenta  Numnber Percenta  Nunmber Per  centa 
Earners  in  family 
None  1,981  24  1,991  26  1,790  36  1,841  38 
One  4,030  48  3,463  46  2,144  43  2,023  42 
Two or more  2,309  28  2,100  28  1,071  21  964  20 
Work  expe-ience 
of head 
Worked, total  5,620  68  4,836  64  2,711  54  2,482  51 
Worked full time, 
50-52 weeks  2,617  31  2,215  29  1,067  21.  879  18 
Sources: U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Current  Population Reports, Series P-60, No.  91, "Characteristics 
of the Low-Income Population:  1972" (1973), Table 4, p.  26, and Series P-60, No.  94,  "Characteristics 
of the Low-Income Population: 1973" (1974), Table 5, p. 8. 
a.  Of total low-income families. 
based  on individual  differences  in labor  productivity  become  incredible."34 
But  neoclassical  economics  does  not claim  that  poverty  will disappear,  and 
even  Adam  Smith  predicted  that  it would  be concentrated  in certain  groups 
of the population.  In addition,  poverty  declined  steadily-among families 
with  wage  earners-over the period  in which  consistent  poverty  data  from 
the Current  Population  Survey  has  been  published  (1959-73-see Table 1). 
The dualists,  however,  do not seem  to subscribe  to the official  government 
definition  of poverty,  apparently  preferring  not only a higher  cutoff  point, 
but also one that rises  with the average  income  of the nonpoor.  Under a 
purely  relative  definition,  poverty  decreases  only  when  the income  distribu- 
tion is compressed.  In this case, however,  the continuing  existence of 
poverty  in no way  contradicts  any  interpretation  of the neoclassical  model. 
An important  unexplored  topic in the dual literature  is the industrial 
wage differential  between  the high- and low-wage sectors. The lack of 
attention  to the aggregate-sector  or industry-specific  wage  rates,  as distinct 
from the wages  received  by individuals,  is probably  related  to the micro- 
economic  focus of the dualist  literature,  as well as to the greater  difficulty 
in classifying  industry  data  than  individual  data  into  primary  and  secondary 
sectors.  But the question  is an important  one for understanding  the me- 
34. Thomas  Vietorisz  and Bennett  Harrison,  "Labor  Market  Segmentation:  Positive 
Feedback and Divergent Development,"  in American Economic Association, Papers 
and Proceedings  of the Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting  (American Economic  Review,  May 
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chanics  of the secondary  labor  market  as well as the income  distribution 
between  the two sectors. 
A  traditional,  neoclassical  analysis would view the relatively struc- 
tureless  secondary  market  as dominated  by supply and demand.  Most 
exponents  of the dual  approach  do not seem  to accept  the  notion  that  tradi- 
tional  forces  of supply  and demand  supplemented  by relevant  social  legis- 
lation  (on minimum  wages  for example)  determine  the wage  rate  in the sec- 
ondary  sector.35  Some  argue  that since  the secondary  market  is dominated 
by women  and  blacks,  the institutional  degree  of racism  and sexism  deter- 
mines  wage  rates.  In the orthodox  model,  discrimination  causes  a crowding 
of the secondary  sector  which  reduces  wages  there  below what  they would 
be if the overall  economy  were competitive,  but the partial  equilibrium 
forces of supply  and demand  specific  to the secondary  market  still deter- 
mine  wages. 
Alternatively,  the wage rate  may reflect  a perfectly  elastic  supply  curve 
of workers  at some wage determined  largely by custom or subsistence. 
Although  the determinants  of "custom"  are unspecified,  social  legislation, 
especially  public  assistance,  seems  to be important  in the dualists'  frame- 
work. Their contention  that jobs are abundant  in the secondary  sector 
suggests  that the social minimum  is dictated  by the reservation  wage of 
workers.  The dualists  themselves,  however,  are reluctant  to view the level 
of public  assistance  (which  they  regard  as too low) as a determinant  of the 
supply  of labor. 
A third  dualist  argument,  which  is based  on the previous  points,  is that, 
since discrimination  and low levels of public assistance  are responsive  to 
political legislation,  the secondary  wage is determined  by political and 
social  forces.  Granted  that a political  model  to explain  government  policy 
endogenously  would be of great interest,  neither  political scientists  nor 
economists  of whatever  persuasion  have been successful  in creating  one. 
Although  the dualists  have  not yet completed  a theory  of the determina- 
tion of the secondary  wage,  some  argue  that  wage  differentials  between  the 
primary  and  secondary  sectors  are  tending  to widen.36  According  to the hy- 
pothesized  mechanism,  high  profits  in the  primary  sector  allow  firms  to pay 
35. This group views the wage as fixed by the needs of society for low-paid workers 
to do dirty  jobs. "The wealthy  in this country have become accustomed  to the services 
supplied  by cheap labor and have little desire to pay decent wages for such things as 
laundered  shirts  and garbage  collection" (Bluestone,  "The Fate of the Poor," p. 127). 
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for considerable on-the-job training, which in turn raises productivity and 
yields a return on the investment that is shared by workers and employers 
in the form of higher wages and profits. The higher profits then generate 
another cycle of human capital investment, higher wages, and so forth. 
This analysis has a number of problems, including its use of absolute levels 
rather than margins as a measure of profitability and its assumption that 
profits will always be plowed back into more human capital in the high- 
wage sector. The last is especially troublesome when firms operate in both 
the primary and secondary markets. 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that such influences are dominated by 
more traditional supply and demand elements which prevent a divergent 
wage structure. Although the industrial wage structure has widened some- 
what in the postwar period, most of that movement is attributable to cycli- 
cal forces and, in particular,  the very narrow wage dispersion that resulted 
from the tight labor market conditions during World War II. 
MOBILITY AND  BARRIERS  TO THE PRIMARY  SECTOR 
One of the most crucial hypotheses of the dualist model is that barriers 
between the primary and secondary sectors that are not based on human 
capital prevent mobility between the two sectors. As described by Blue- 
stone, 
many  of those who suffer  from  low wages  and  unemployment  have  a considerable 
amount  of human  capital.  They fail to find  jobs which  pay a living  wage  because 
of racism, sexism, economic depression, and uneven economic development 
of industries  and regions....  Given the opportunity  to escape  to the high-wage 
sector, many low-wage workers would perform  admirably.  Without years of 
extra  education,  without  massive  doses of institutional  and on-the-job  training, 
without  learning  a new "industrial  discipline,"  many  low-wage  workers  could fit 
into a unionized,  profitable,  capital-intensive  industry  and begin  to earn  a living 
wage.37 
Unfortunately, an impartial test of the mobility model is difficult to for- 
mulate. The "small amount" of mobility that would confirm the dual model 
37. Bluestone, "The Fate of the Poor," pp. 121, 123. Garth L. Mangum agrees: 
"The basic manpower  obstacle is still the supply of [good] jobs. Even during 1966-68 
when  labor  markets  in general  were  tight,  there  were  never  enough  jobs in rural  depressed 
areas or central  city ghettos within the occupational  ranges  attainable  by the disadvan- 
taged...."  See his "Manpower  Research  and Manpower  Policy,"  in Industrial  Relations 
Research Association  Series, A Review of Inidustrial  Relations Research, Vol.  2 (Univer- 
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remains  to be defined.  At what point does the dual model become  indis- 
tinguishable  from a neoclassical  segmentation  model, such as the one 
suggested  by Holt? 
The evidence  on the mobility  issue  clearly  refutes  a literal  interpretation 
of the dualist  model. The recent  micro studies  that dichotomize  the job 
structure  of the economy  in the manner  outlined  by the dual literature 
suggests  a significant  amount  of mobility  between  the two sectors.38  The 
macro study by Okun also strongly  supports  mobility, revealing,  in a 
cyclical,  time series  context,  a substantial  amount  of upgrading  during  the 
economic  expansion  of the late 1960s.39 
In drawing  a definite  boundary  between  the two sectors, Doeringer, 
Piore,  and  others  had suggested  that  aggregate  demand  policies  would  lead 
the primary  sector  to subcontract  work  to the secondary  sector  rather  than 
increase  its own employment.  Although  some subcontracting  may have 
occurred  during  the recent  expansion,  Okun's  analysis  shows  that the em- 
ployment  boundaries  were  also significantly  pierced.40  Although  the ulti- 
mate result  was to force the monetary  and fiscal authorities  to brake  an 
inflationary  economy,  the  findings  have  important  implications  for  the dual 
literature.  Indeed,  the inflationary  consequences  heighten  the significance. 
Contrary  to the dualist  model,  which  views  primary  and  secondary  workers 
as close substitutes,  the increase  in the inflation  rate  in the late 1960s  sup- 
ports the neoclassical  position that secondary  workers  can be integrated 
into primary  jobs only  with  some  difficulty  in the form  of more,  or costlier, 
training.  It points  to the presence  of bottlenecks  in the supply  of different 
skills  rather  than widespread  underemployment  within  a relatively  homo- 
geneous  labor  force, as charged  by the dualists. 
UNDEREMPLOYMENT:  LOCKING  GOOD WORKERS  INTO 
THE  SECONDARY  SECTOR 
The dualists  agree  that some secondary  jobs are  filled  with  lower-skilled 
workers-teenagers  beginning  their work careers with little education, 
females  interested  in part-time  employment,  and  workers  with  low aptitude 
38. See the first  three  articles  listed in note 28 above for examples.  Results of work  in 
progress,  reported  by Robert  E. Hall in a personal  conversation,  suggest  quite extensive 
mobility. 
39. Okun, "Upward  Mobility." 
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and hence  low human  capital  and skill. The central  claim of the dual ap- 
proach,  however,  is that this successful  matching  of unskilled  workers  and 
secondary  jobs is overemphasized  in the neoclassical  model. Rather,  the 
dualists  support  the contrary  hypothesis:  that underemployment  is perva- 
sive,  in that good workers  are  locked  into bad  jobs. 
Once  a strict  dual  model  yields  to a more  generally  segmented  model,  the 
question  of whether  good workers  are  locked  into bad  jobs becomes  more 
complex.  Exclusion  of secondary  workers  from the "good"  jobs in the 
primary  sector  is relatively  easy  to visualize  theoretically,  given  the  barriers 
to entry  erected  by oligopolies  and unions.  But exclusion  from the "fair" 
jobs in the "gray"  sectors,  where  entry  is relatively  easy,  is harder  to under- 
stand.  If the good workers  are  there,  why  don't  new  firms  enter  the market 
and utilize  their  talents?  Four explanations  have  been offered  for this lack 
of competitive  response:  discrimination,  feedback,  life-cycle  effects,  and 
information  externalities. 
Discrimination. According  to the dual literature,  discrimination-par- 
ticularly  racial  discrimination-is  the major  institutional  barrier  that con- 
fines  certain  workers  to the secondary  sector.  This  is illustrated  by the  lower 
returns  to education  for inner-city,  low-wage  blacks than for inner-city, 
low-wage  whites  that  Harrison  found.41  Mobility  studies  also indicate  that 
blacks have a more difficult  time in escaping  from the secondary  sector 
once they take their  first  job there.  Finally,  the proportion  of blacks  em- 
ployed  in the secondary  sector  far exceeds  that in the labor  force. 
Clearly,  discrimination  plays a central  role in the dualist  view of the 
working  of the labor market  and the importance  of underemployment. 
Barriers  to upward  mobility  can be posited  on pervasive  social  mores  with- 
out resort  to radical  arguments  of employer  collusion.  Unfortunately,  there 
is neither  a generally  acceptable  neoclassical  nor dualist  theory  of discrim- 
ination. 
Although  the dualists  have analyzed  the empirical  importance  of dis- 
crimination,  they have not investigated  the extent to which ongoing  dis- 
crimination  exerts  its force in the labor  market  rather  than  before workers 
enter it. This issue, however,  is crucial  to their policy views. By largely 
ignoring  pre-labor  market  discrimination,  the dualists  can downplay  man- 
power training  and stress underemployment.  It is difficult,  however,  to 
judge whether  blacks are seriously  disadvantaged  in labor markets  cur- 
rently,  given  the  endowments  they  bring  to market.  Their  endowments  may 
41. Harrison,  Education,  Training,  and the Urban  Ghetto. Michael  L. Wachter  661 
be inaccurately  measured because of the inability to measure the quality of 
schooling  and  to  capture feedback  from  such  variables as  the  socio- 
economic status of the parents. For example, Hall and Kasten, who in- 
cluded a socioeconomic status variable as part of the labor market endow- 
ment of blacks, concluded that "while the sixties saw the nearly complete 
elimination of racial bias in the way that the labor market assigned in- 
dividuals to occupations, literally no progress was made during the period 
in augmenting the endowments of blacks relative to  whites."42 Further- 
more, Freeman finds that government policies, especially on the state and 
local levels, are largely responsible for the poor labor market endowments 
of blacks.43 
Feedback restraints. Do  low-wage workers need additional training to 
compete with primary-sector workers? The  dualists are involved in  an 
ambiguity in  addressing this key  question. On the  one hand, the  dual 
literature (especially Piore44)  has made an important contribution by con- 
centrating on  feedback  mechanisms in  secondary employment, which, 
through unstable employment relationships, encourage workers who hold 
"bad" jobs to become "bad" workers-or,  more precisely, to adopt bad 
work habits. The dualists, however, have ignored some of the implications 
of the feedback model in explaining barriers.  Once the worker in the second- 
ary sector has developed bad habits (or received feedback), he is less skilled 
and less trainable than the primary-sector worker and thus, unlike the 
victim of discrimination, he is not underemployed. 
In addition, the proposition that workers are influenced by the instability 
of their jobs to become more unstable in their work attachments is only 
part of a larger system of feedback, in which workers are influenced by 
42. Robert E. Hall and Richard  A. Kasten, "The Relative Occupational  Success of 
Blacks and Whites,"  BPEA (3:1973), pp. 791-92. 
43. Richard B. Freeman, "Alternative  Theories of Labor-Market  Discrimination: 
Individual  and Collective  Behavior,"  in von Furstenberg  and others (eds.), Patterns  of 
Racial  Discrimination,  Vol.  2. Court rulings, following  the  1971 Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co. decision  (401 U.S. 424), have, in effect,  adopted  the dualist  view of the workings  of 
the labor market.  The decision makes almost no effort to control for the lower labor 
market endowments  of blacks. For example, with blue-collar  occupations, the courts 
commonly  find labor market  discrimination  when the percentage  of blacks  in the firm  is 
substantially  lower  than  the percentage  of blacks  in the community.  This  may  be good so- 
cial policy-or  at least it is aimed at achieving  a desirable  social end-but  its economic 
underpinning  is open to controversy. 
44. Michael J. Piore, "Jobs and Training," in Samuel H.  Beer and Richard E. 
Barringer  (eds.), The  State and  the  Poor  (Winthrop,  1970).  Feedback  effects  have  received 
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many  socioeconomic  factors  including their family background.  Some 
sociologists and psychologists who have focused on feedback effects have 
been led to formulate the "culture of poverty" hypothesis.45 
Feedback models have received increasing attention in the economic 
literature. For  example, according to  Arrow's work on  discrimination, 
blacks who believe that they will receive a lower rate of return from their 
training will undertake less training-specific  as well as general. They then 
ensure a self-fulfilling prophecy: if employers originally discriminate be- 
cause they believe that blacks are not good workers, then blacks will turn 
out to be less skilled workers because they will invest less in education.46 
Empirically, feedback effects appear to be important, whether measured 
by variables reflecting attitudes or socioeconomic  status.47  According to 
Goodwin,  welfare mothers communicate to their children a sense of in- 
adequacy that may inhibit labor force behavior. Since 15 percent of the 
children in this country (10 percent of white children and 38 percent of non- 
white ones) are reared in low-income families, and over 20 percent of the 
current  group of young workers spent their childhoods in poverty, a sizable 
proportion of today's and tomorrow's work force is vulnerable to attitudes 
that compromise their full economic development. Furthermore,  some poor 
children bear an additional handicap in that they are raised in relatively 
large families-a  disproportionate number of families with four or more 
children are in the poverty category (see Table 2). Evidence indicates that 
children growing up in large families tend to achieve less education and 
are otherwise less well endowed than those from smaller families. 
In a study using identical twins, in which shared environmental experi- 
ences in childhood and genetic effects could be studied, Taubman estimated 
that these two effects explained almost one-half of the total variation in 
wages among individuals.48  Although economic research into feedback is 
only beginning, it appears to be an important and promising area. 
45. For the culture-of-poverty  hypothesis  see, for example,  Daniel P. Moynihan  (ed.), 
On Understanding  Poverty:  Perspective  from the Social Scienices  (Basic Books, 1969); 
and Edward  C. Banfield,  The Unheavenly  City (Little, Brown, 1968). 
46. Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Theory of Discrimination,"  in Ashenfelter  and Rees 
(eds.), Discrimiination  in Labor  Markets. 
47. See, for example, Andrisani, "Dual Labor Market Theory"; and  Leonard 
Goodwin, Do the Poor Want  to Work?  A Social-Psychological  Study of Work  Orienta- 
tions  (Brookings  Institution,  1972). 
48. Paul Taubman,  "The Determinants  of Earnings:  A Study of White  Male Twins" 
(University  of Pennsylvania,  1974; processed).  In general,  the environmental  experience 
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Table  2. Distribution  of Children  in Low-Income  and  Nonpoor 
Families,  By Size of Family,  1972 
Thousands,  except  as noted 
Low-income  familiesa  Nonpoor  familiesa 
Size offamily and  Per-  Total  number  Per-  Total  number 
mean  statistic  centage  of children  centage  of children 
Number  of related 
children  under  18 
None  28.7  0  44.9  0 
One  18.9  958  20.2  9,947 
Two  17.0  1,720  18.1  17,848 
Three  13.3  2,034  9.8  14,433 
Four  9.9  2,012  4.2  8,272 
Five  6.9  1,745  1.7  4,070 
Six or more  5.3  1,626  1.2  3,678 
Total  100.0  10,095b  100.0  58,248b 
Mean  number  of children 
Per family  ...  1.99  ...  1.18 
Per farnily  with at least 
one child  ...  2.79  ...  2.14 
In family per child  ...  3.67  ...  2.82 
Sources: Bureau of the Census, Series P-60, No.  91, "Characteristics  of the Low-Income Population, 
1972," Table 38, pp. 117-19; and Series P-60, No.  90, "Money Income in 1972 of Families and Persons in 
the United States" (1973), Table 21, p. 59. The percentage details may not sum to  100 due to rounding. 
a.  The definition of low income varies with family size. 
b. Differs from that in source because of statistical discrepancy. 
Feedback models do not support the conclusion that better jobs, rather 
than better training, are the answer to  the low-wage problem. They do 
suggest, however, that manpower training of adult workers is likely to be a 
costly process, which must remedy not only deficiencies in past education, 
but also the negative signals that the worker has received from society. 
This confirms the conventional wisdom that attempts to narrow the dis- 
tribution of human capital should focus on the early years of education. 
Although the dualists have ignored some of the implications of their work 
on feedback effects, most neoclassical economists have ignored them al- 
together. Tastes are unimportant to those who see behavior as supply re- 
sponses to different market opportunities facing individuals and families. 
Life-cycle effects. Both neoclassical and dual economists have explored 
the way unanticipated declines in labor demand have trapped individuals in 
disadvantageous geographical areas, occupations, or specialized industries. 
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The  dualists  appear  to regard  this as a failure  in the equalizing  mechanism 
of the  neoclassical  model.  This  is not the case.  The  equalizing  tendencies  of 
the neoclassical  model work in the labor market,  but they work across 
cohort  groups.  With finite  life spans, individuals  cannot repeatedly  take 
new decisions  on human  investment  or career.  Each cohort attempts  to 
avoid  the mistakes  and overcome  the handicaps  of its predecessors,  but it 
may  not have  the time  to correct  its own  errors  or to avoid  the new  barriers 
that a dynamic  economy  may create. 
Information  externalities.  If workers  or firms  have  imperfect  information 
about the qualifications  of workers  (or the skill requirements  of firms), 
multiple  equilibria  may exist and the economy  may settle  at a suboptimal 
point.  In particular,  imperfect  information  may upset  the normal  ordering 
of workers  and  jobs so that  good workers  become  locked  into bad  jobs. In 
fact, information  is unquestionably  imperfect,  the economy  is in disequi- 
librium,  and  many  workers  do not receive  their  "perfect  information,  equi- 
librium  wage."49  The real issue is an empirical  one: how important  are 
these  externalities? 
To some extent  discrimination  can be treated  as an information  exter- 
nality;  for example,  employers,  uncertain  as to the skill of job applicants, 
hire  prime-age  white  males  for the "good"  jobs because  that demographic 
group  has, on average,  the highest  average  educational  achievement  and, 
at least, may be believed  to have the best  job records.  Although  many of 
the dualists  deal with discrimination,  it seems unlikely  that they intend 
underemployment  in the secondary  sector  to apply only to those groups 
who provide  their own inexpensive  signaling  mechanism  based on demo- 
graphic  characteristics  such  as race,  sex, and  age. An unanswered  question, 
however,  is whether  there  is a dual labor  market,  or significant  underem- 
ployment  in the secondary  sector,  for  prime-age  white  males.  The  allocation 
of  jobs among  white  males  raises  the general  question  of the  job allocation 
mechanism  within any demographic  group (for example, among black 
females).  The neoclassical  model predicts  that (given  that discrimination 
lowers  the earnings  of black  females)  the wage  ranking  of members  within 
a demographic  group  depends  largely  upon  such  variables  as human  capital 
49. "Recognizing"  the true worth of the secondary worker is considerably  easier 
than the "upward-sloping  demand  curve" notion in the development  literature.  There, 
an increase  in wages, by increasing  nutritional  levels, improves  productivity.  The lagged 
response  of productivity  to the increase  in wages could conceivably  hide the optimal 
solution  from the employer. Michael L.  Wachter  665 
and unionization.  It is unclear  that the dualists  offer an alternative  ex- 
planation. 
The fact that a good deal of variation  in family or individual  earnings 
cannot  be explained  in regression  analysis  is not supporting  evidence  for 
the dualist  model.  Although  some interpret  the residual  in earnings  equa- 
tions as proving  the importance  of "luck,"  or nonneoclassical  variables,  in 
determining  the income  distribution,50  the residual  may as readily  be the 
missing  "perfect"  measure  of IQ or the quality of education.  The real 
problem  is to formulate  measurable  independent  variables  that  can explain 
underemployment  and differentiate  between  the competing  theories. 
To summarize,  both the neoclassical  and dual models can encompass 
underemployment,  in which  good workers  are locked into bad jobs. The 
neoclassicists  lay the blame  for it on discrimination  and life-cycle  effects, 
while  the dualists  see it as pervasive  among  secondary  workers,  presumably 
including  prime-age  white males. A rigorous  empirical  test of the dual 
underemployment  hypothesis,  however,  has not been attempted,  and  given 
the available  data,  may not be feasible. 
The Poverty-Unemployment  Nexus 
THE NEW  STRUCTURAL  UNEMPLOYMENT 
One major  thrust  of the dual literature  is its new interpretation  of un- 
employment  in the secondary  sector.  Even  when  aggregate  unemployment 
rates  fall below 4 percent,  unemployment  in secondary  labor  markets  re- 
mains  quite  high.  The dualists  argue  that in spite  of these  high unemploy- 
ment rates,  anyone  who wants  a typical  secondary  job can work  because 
vacancies  are abundant  at the prevailing  wage rate for such jobs. The 
problem  is that as a consequence  of low wages, poor promotion  possi- 
bilities, and "bad"  jobs, individuals  choose not to work steadily  on any 
one  job. Facing  only  low costs of specific  training  and  turnover,  employers, 
for their  part,  have no incentive  to encourage  stability  and, in certain  cir- 
cumstances,  may actually  discourage  it-for  example,  when unionization 
is a threat.  The implicit  hypothesis  that the worker's  wage is below his 
reservation  wage suggests,  as discussed  below, that the unemployment  is 
structural.  Thus, high quit rates, high unemployment  rates, and high 
50. See, for example, Christopher  Jencks, Inequality:  A Reassessment  of the Effect 
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vacancy  rates  coexist  as workers  move among  jobs and in and out of un- 
employment  and the labor  force. For many  secondary  workers,  the com- 
bination  of low wages  with  periods  of unemployment  or nonattachment  to 
the labor  force  means  family  incomes  below the poverty  level. 
According  to the dualists  the character  of this unemployment  cannot  be 
explained  readily  in the neoclassical  framework.  However,  the dual  model 
of unemployment  is compatible  with  neoclassical  theory;  that is, the dual- 
ists have suggested  different  parameters  for a more orthodox  model of 
structural  unemployment.51  For example,  the explanation  for structural 
unemployment  offered  by the  Keynesians  in the  early  1960s  was  that  certain 
groups  of workers  were  isolated  in geographical  regions,  or in occupations 
characterized  by inadequate  demand,  and thus encountered  difficulties  in 
finding  employment.  These  workers  would,  for a time,  be a component  of 
the long-term  unemployed  and finally  would  drop out of the labor  force, 
thusjoining  the "hidden  unemployed"  composed  of discouraged  workers.52 
This  older  view  emphasizes  the  excess  supply  of low-skilled  workers,  where- 
as the dual  model  stresses  the adequacy  of demand  for secondary  workers. 
The  concern  of the dualists  has thus  switched  from  problems  of inadequate 
demand  for workers  to the low wages  available  to secondary  workers. 
The theoretical  underpinnings  of the dualist position may be recon- 
structed  in neoclassical  form.  Workers  may be viewed  as maximizing  util- 
ity. Family  income  depends  upon  the wages  offered,  upon  hours  worked  by 
family  members,  and upon transfer  payments  that set a floor on the stan- 
dard  of living, and also vary  with wage income  (as is the case with food 
stamps).  The higher  the benefit  level relative  to the wage rate, the more 
likely that the working  members  of the family will choose not to work 
full-time  the year  round.  This  unemployment,  however,  does  not fit a tradi- 
tional job-search  model, in which periods of unemployment  are spent 
searching  for a better  job. Instead,  individuals  in the secondary  market 
seem to move from one bad job to another.  The findings  are consistent 
with the timing  phenomenon  suggested  by Mincer.53  If benefits  are more 
51. Indeed, some neoclassical economists were coincidentally  reporting the same 
findings  as those reported  by the dualists.  See Hall, "Why Is the Unemployment  Rate 
So High?" 
52. The notion that a significant  discouraged-worker  effect is concentrated  in the 
early 1960s is stated in Michael L. Wachter,  "A Labor Supply Model for Secondary 
Workers," Review of Economics and Statistics,  Vol.  54 (May  1972), pp.  141-51. 
53. Jacob  Mincer,  "Labor  Force Participation  of Married  Women:  A Study  of Labor 
Supply," in Aspects of Labor Economics,  A Conference  of the Universities-National Michael L.  Wachter  667 
easily  received  and if labor  is less onerous  when  the individual  works  only 
part  of the year,  the pattern  of instability  observed  by the dualists  emerges. 
Rather  than  work  at random,  however,  individuals  will attempt  to partici- 
pate when  jobs are easiest  to find and wages  are relatively  high. Further- 
more,  although  upward  mobility  from  the  low-  to the  high-wage  sector  may 
be limited,  searching  for a higher-paying  and better  secondary  job may be 
worthwhile-especially  when the income  lost by not working  is relatively 
small.  In a multisector  (rather  than  dual)  market,  the potential  gains  from 
search  increase. 
The unemployment  model  can be generalized  in a straightforward  man- 
ner to include  both the pure  timing  aspect  and the queuing  for  jobs in the 
high-wage  sector  (or alternatively,  the better  jobs in the low-wage  sector).54 
The utility-maximization  problem  is broadened  so that the worker  decides 
on hours  of labor  force  attachment,  given  the wage  in the low-wage  sector 
and  the wage  and  perceived  probability  of finding  employment  in relatively 
high-wage  sectors.  The model  thus determines,  for secondary  workers,  (1) 
the supply  of labor  to the low-wage  sector;  (2) the length  of the queue  in 
the relatively  high-wage  sector;  and  (3) the amount  of time  spent  out of the 
labor  force. 
EVIDENCE  ON  SHIFTS IN  STRUCTURAL  UNEMPLOYMENT 
In view of the disagreements  about the empirical  nature  of unemploy- 
ment, an important  issue is whether  structural  unemployment  has been 
changing  over  time.  Are the  job instability  and  excess  supply  that  the dual- 
ists cite relatively  new or have  they  prevailed  for a generation?  The  dualists 
focus their  empirical  work on the late 1960s  and early 1970s.  The dualist 
view of unemployment  implies  a strongly  pessimistic  assessment  of aggre- 
gate  demand  management  which  in turn  leads  to their  policy  recommenda- 
tion for the government  to create  more good  jobs. That recommendation 
is particularly  questionable  since it is supported  only by cross-section 
Bureau  Committee  for Economic  Research  (Princeton  University  Press  for the National 
Bureau  of Economic Research,  1962). Although Mincer's  model is designed  to explain 
the behavior  of females  who had only partial  commitment  to the labor force, the timing 
effect  is applicable  to all secondary  workers. 
54. A model of queuing  unemployment  is presented  in Stephen  A. Ross and Michael 
L. Wachter,  "Wage Determination,  Inflation,  and the Industrial  Structure,"  American 
Economic  Review,  Vol. 63 (September  1973), pp. 675-92. 668  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
studies.  Moreover,  that limitation  is inherent,  given  the lack of time series 
evidence  on the dynamics  of the unemployment  problem. 
The evidence  for the 1948-73  period-especially for the past decade- 
suggests  that the incidence  of unemployment  has shifted  to the disadvan- 
tage  of demographic  groups  most likely  to be represented  in the secondary 
sector,  particularly  males  aged 16-24  and females  16-44 relative  to prime- 
age males.55  While  the incidence  among  young  secondary  workers  of both 
sexes  has  increased,  the duration  of their  unemployment  spells  has  declined, 
according  to the evidence  presented  by Perry.  In other  words,  unemploy- 
ment  for secondary  workers  has been increasingly  marked  by shorter  but 
far more frequent  spells.56  These  trends  are especially  striking  in view of 
the  relative  increase  in employment  in nonmanufacturing,  the major  source 
of jobs for secondary  workers,  and the narrowing  of wage differentials 
between  black  and  white  workers.  Both  of these  factors  implied  an  improve- 
ment rather than a decline in the employment  stability  for secondary 
workers. 
Welfarejudgments  about  this  growing  incidence  of unemployment  among 
secondary  workers  are  hazardous,  however.  There  has, for example,  been a 
steady  decline  in the poverty  population,  especially  among  families  with  at 
least one wage  earner.  Meanwhile,  the bottom  fifth  of the income  distribu- 
tion has had a roughly  constant  share  of income.  Furthermore,  during  the 
1960s  young  black  workers  achieved  sharper  income  gains  than  did whites 
and older  blacks.57 
55. This is based on results obtained by regressing  the unemployment  rate of each 
demographic  group on the unemployment  rate for prime-age  males and a time trend. 
Both a continuous time trend and a time trend broken in 1962 were tested. See also 
R. A. Gordon, "Some Macroeconomic  Aspects of Manpower  Policy," in Lloyd Ulman 
(ed.), Manpower  Programs  in the Policy Mix (Johns Hopkins University  Press, 1973); 
and George L. Perry, "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  BPEA (3:1970), pp. 
411-41. 
56. George L. Perry, "Unemployment  Flows in the U.S. Labor Market," BPEA 
(2:1972), pp. 245-78. Although the incidence of unemployment  for older black males 
has improved slightly, their labor force participation  rates have fallen dramatically. 
Hence, the changing  pattern  of labor market  behavior  may have affected  older  blacks  in 
the secondary  sector by decreasing  their participation  rates rather  than increasing  their 
unemployment  rates. 
57. Richard  B. Freeman,  "Changes  in the Labor Market  for Black  Americans,  1948- 
72," BPEA (1: 1973), pp. 67-120. The discrepancy  between  the income and unemploy- 
ment experiences  of young blacks may reflect a growing variance  in black economic 
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The changing  nature of unemployment,  with the associated  poverty 
problems,  raises important  questions.  First, why has the incidence  and 
duration  of unemployment  changed?  Second,  is the economy  now fixed 
into the new pattern  or are further  alterations  likely? 
Although  these questions  raise issues that go far beyond the scope of 
this paper,  answers  to them are needed  to evaluate  the policy proposals 
recommended  in the dual literature.  Several  broad developments  in the 
secondary  market  may  have accounted  for the increasing  instability.  First, 
the relative  cost of being  unemployed  or out of the labor  force  has declined 
as a result  of government  transfer  programs.  Although  that relative  cost 
should  affect  unemployment,  according  to the underlying  reasoning  of the 
dualists,  it is not included  explicitly  in their  argument.  Their  field  work  and 
empirical  analysis  indicate  that  workers  in the secondary  market  move  fre- 
quently  between  work  in the low-wage  sector  and the welfare  sector  (and 
also between  those  two sectors  and the "irregular  economy"  of illegal  and 
quasi-legal  work).58  The higher  the level of welfare  payments,  the  less  time 
workers  are forced  to spend  in secondary  jobs. 
The relative  protection  against unemployment  and poverty  increased 
substantially  in the  late 1960s  and  early  1970s.  The  average  benefit  payment 
to a recipient  of aid to families  with dependent  children  (AFDC) has in- 
creased  by 103  percent  from 1963  to 1974,  while  average  hourly  earnings 
have  increased  by only 85 percent,59  and has also increased  relative  to the 
minimum  wage.  Moreover,  the effective  coverage  of AFDC has vastly  ex- 
panded,  as have  in-kind  transfers  to the poor,  especially  food stamps,  child 
58. Vietorisz  and Harrison,  "Positive  Feedback,"  for example,  states that "the wel- 
fare system  is an integral  part of this vicious circle. On the one hand, it acts as a payroll 
subsidy  to secondary  employers;  on the other  hand,  it maintains  living  levels  low enough 
to force  a steady  flow of labor  supply  into the secondary  labor  market"  (p. 366).  Although 
they would prefer welfare payments  to be high enough so that the low-wage earners 
could avoid working,  they clearly  recognize  that the labor supply  of secondary  workers 
is responsive  to the level of benefits.  See also, Harrison, Education,  Training,  and the 
Urban  Ghetto,  especially  Chap. 5. An impressive  and detailed study of the large dis- 
incentive  effects  of the welfare  system  is contained  in various  reports  in Studies  in Public 
Welfare,  Prepared  for the Use of the Subcommittee  on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Eco- 
nomic Committee,  92 Cong. 2 sess (1972), and 93 Cong. 1 sess., 2 sess. (1973, 1974). 
59. Employment  and  Earnings,  Vol. 21 (July  1974),  Table  C-1, p. 91; U.S. Department 
of Health, Education,  and Welfare,  Trend  Report:  Graphic  Presentation  of Public  Assis- 
tance and Related Data ...  1971 (1972), p. 7; and unpublished  data from the U.S. 
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nutrition,  housing  subsidies,  and medicaid.  From 1967 to 1972, in-kind 
benefits  increased  700 percent,  while cash payments  (consisting  of social 
security,  public  assistance,  veterans'  compensation,  and  unemployment  ben- 
efits) rose 72 percent.  In 1972 average  AFDC payments  for a recipient 
family  of four with no income  were $2,947.  In the unusual  case in which 
the  family  also  received  food stamps,  public  housing,  and  medicaid,  benefit 
levels would have been $5,349  (equivalent  to $6,015 of taxable  income), 
25 percent  above the poverty  threshold  for 1972  and even exceeding  the 
pay for many  full-time  secondary  jobs.60 
A second  possible  explanation  for the growth  of employment  instability 
is associated  with the growing  share  of the 16-24 age groups  in the labor 
force.61  The  sharp  increase  in  the  percentage  representation  of young  women 
in the labor force that occurred  between 1960 and 1973 reflected  both 
the growing  percentage  of the young  in the population  (a consequence  of 
the baby boom of the late 1940s  and 1950s-see Table 3) and rising  par- 
ticipation  rates.  The change  in the percentage  of young  males  in the labor 
force was smaller,  reflecting  a nearly  constant  participation  rate,  but also 
positive.  This  overall  increase  in the  representation  of young  workers  in the 
labor  force  is of great  importance,  not only  because  of their  especially  high 
turnover  and  unemployment  rates  but also because,  to the extent  that  they 
are imperfect  substitutes  for older workers,  an increase  in their relative 
number  may  have  caused  the increase  in their  already  high  unemployment 
rates.62  Since young workers  have not had the time to acquire  specific 
training,  they are most competitive  with secondary  older  workers.  Hence, 
ceteris  paribus,  the influx  of young  workers  may  well  have  depressed  wages 
60. The poverty level was $4,275 in 1972; see Bureau of the Census, Series P-60, 
No. 91, p. 141 (cited in Table 1 above), and James  R. Storey, "Welfare  in the 70's: A 
National Study of Benefits  Available in 100 Local Areas," Studies  in Public Welfare, 
Paper 15, p. 4. In 1972, almost all AFDC recipients  were eligible  for medicaid,  69 per- 
cent received  food stamps  or commodities,  and 14 percent  were  living in public housing 
units (Storey, p. 3). It should be recognized  that the income data that measure the 
poverty  population  (as in Table 1) do not include in-kind  transfers. 
61. There  is some evidence  that the increasing  coverage  of minimum  wage laws may 
also have  contributed  to the instability  problem  in the secondary  sector.  See, for example, 
Marvin  Kosters  and Finis Welch, "Tlhe  Effects  of Minimum  Wages  on the Distribution 
of Changes  in Aggregate  Employment,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 62 (June  1972), 
pp. 323-32. 
62. The imperfect  substitution  argument  is an important  component of Richard  A. 
Easterlin, Population, Labor Force, and Long Swings in Economic Growth: The American 
Experience  (Columbia  University  Press  for the National Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
1968). Michael L.  Wachter  671 
Table  3. Distribution  of Civilian  Labor  Force  and  Population,  by 
Sex and  Age Groups,  Selected  Years,  1950-90 
Actual  Projecteda 
Sex and 
age group  1950  1960  1970  1973  1980  1990 
Percent  of civilian  labor  force, aged 16 and overb 
Males 
16 to 24  11.5  9.9  11.7  13.2  12.4  9.2 
25 to 54  45.7  44.2  38.9  37.8  38.6  42.8 
55 and over  13.3  12.5  11.2  10.0  9.8  8.5 
Females 
16 to 24  7.1  6.7  9.8  10.6  10.3  8.1 
25 to 54  18.6  21.1  22.0  22.4  22.7  25.5 
55 and over  3.9  5.6  6.3  5.9  6.3  5.8 
Percent  of totalpopulation,  aged 16 and overb 
Males 
16 to 24  9.3  9.0  11.5  11.6  11.4  8.8 
25 to 54  28.6  27.4  24.5  24.5  25.0  28.0 
55 and over  11.5  12.4  12.1  11.9  11.6  11.2 
Females 
16 to 24  9.3  8.9  11.2  11.4  11.0  8.5 
25 to 54  29.2  28.2  25.6  25.5  25.7  28.4 
55 and over  12.1  14.1  15.1  15.1  15.3  15.1 
Sources: Manpower  Report of the President, 1974, Tables A-3, E-2, E-7, pp. 255, 350, 353; Bureau of the 
Census, Current  Population Reports, Series P-25, No.  519, "Estimates of  the Population of  the United 
States, by Age, Sex, and Race- April 1, 1960 to July 1, 1973" (1974), Table 1, pp. 12, 15, 25; and Series 
P-25, No. 311, "Estimates of the Population of the United States, by Single Years of Age, Color, and Sex, 
1900 to 1959" (1965), pp. 22-23. 
a.  The projected figures are based on official government calculations. 
b.  Details may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 
in the secondary  sector and postponed  the improvement  of labor force 
conditions  for black  males  (who are disproportionately  represented  in the 
secondary  sector). 
To the extent  that increasing  instability  has resulted  from these demo- 
graphic  shifts,  matters  should  improve  with  the anticipated  reversal  of the 
demographic  pattern  by the 1980s  (reflecting  the drop  in births  in the 1960s 
and early 1970s).  The surfeit  of young workers  will disappear  and prime- 
age workers  will become  more  abundant.  Although  the next generation  of 
prime-age  workers  may experience  more unemployment  than the current 
generation  as a consequence  of their  unfavorable  work  experience  in their 
early  years,  severe  job instability  should  decrease  on the whole.  The policy 
implications  of these  trends  are discussed  in the final  section. 672  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
Policy  Issues 
The  major  policy  proposal  of the dualists  calls on government  to create 
more  good  jobs, in either  the private  or the public  sphere,  but more  likely 
in the latter. Although the dualists  do not oppose manpower  training, 
aggregate  demand  policies  aimed  at full employment,  or transfer  payments 
to the lower-income  groups,  they argue that these programs  have been 
largely  ineffective.  Hence  the need for direct  action.63 
DIRECT  CREATION  OF GOOD  JOBS 
The  private  sector. Given the assumption  that secondary  workers  have 
the human  capital  that they need  to succeed  in primary  jobs, the creation 
of additional  good  jobs is a simple  task.  The dualists  suggest  that the gov- 
ernment  impose  on the secondary  sector  the characteristics  of the primary 
sector, by such methods as increasing  the coverage  and extent of the 
minimum wage laws, encouraging  unionization,  and expanding  social 
legislation  in general.64  In essence,  these  dualist  proposals  are designed  to 
legislate  higher  wages;  and if higher  wages  are all that is required  to con- 
vert a poor  job into a good one, these policies  should  work. 
63. In concentrating  on the issue of creating  more  good  jobs, the dualists  have  ignored 
the implications  of the feedback  effects  that are inherent  in their own argument.  In some 
sense, they have neglected  the cycle of poverty  and have assumed  more equality  among 
workers  than they have evidence  to justify. In a broader  context, their  recommendations 
can be reinterpreted  as means  for breaking  the cycle at the point of labor market  activity. 
Whether  this is a least-cost  or even  a viable  solution  is unclear.  The social and psycholog- 
ical features  of the literature  on the cycle of poverty  do not encourage  optimism  on this 
score. 
64. Doeringer  and Piore,  Internal  Labor  Markets,  pp. 204-08; also Thomas  Vietorisz, 
"We Need a $3.50 Minimum  Wage," Challenzge,  Vol. 16 (May/June 1973), pp. 49 ff. 
Adding the cost-of-living  increases  since the Vietorisz  article was published  results  in a 
minimum  of approximately  $4.15. This,  in turn,  translates  into a minimum  yearly  income 
for the fully employed  of $8,300. 
The unionization  policy may not contribute  much to this policy package because 
many industries  that are now nonunion could support only weak unions that could 
achieve little or no wage premium.  If product markets  are national or international  in 
scope and are easy to enter,  then it is difficult  to maintain  a strongly  unionized  industry. 
Where  competition is confined to the United States, rules requiring  unionization and 
industry-wide  bargaining  might succeed. Where international  competition is present, 
even these stringent  methods might not drive  up wages. Michael  L. Wachter  673 
The main issue about the dualist  suggestion  is the validity  of its basic 
premise  that the needed  human  capital  is present  although  latent. If this 
premise  is false, legislated  wage  increases  will add to unemployment.  The 
jobless can always  be helped  by increasing  unemployment  compensation 
and public  assistance;  but these techniques  are hardly  in the spirit  of the 
dualists'  aims. To eliminate  the secondary  sector, the economy would 
simply  build  a larger  welfare  sector. 
The dualists  appear  to recognize  these  problems,  and  some  offer  policies 
to offset  the problems  created  by their  solution  of legislating  higher  wages. 
Vietorisz  suggests  cushioning  the disemployment  effect  by a transitional 
employment  freeze, wage and price controls (but especially  the latter), 
assistance  to businesses  in industries  in which  firms  are squeezed  out by 
higher wages and the employment  freeze, and transitional  import con- 
trols.65  The transition  period is expected  to be short because the now 
better-paid  secondary  workers  should  quickly  respond  by increasing  their 
productivity.  In the view of neoclassical  economists,  however,  these sup- 
plementary  policy suggestions,  such as employment  freezes and import 
controls,  would  create  much  more  serious  domestic  and  international  prob- 
lems than even  the original  undiluted  prescription  of higher  wages. 
To the extent  that  good  jobs are  defined  not only  by high wages  but also 
by on-the-job  training  and promotion  possibilities,  none of these recom- 
mendations  is sure  to work.  Instead,  well-developed  internal  labor  markets 
are  needed.  Hence,  the missing  ingredients  are  measures  to encourage  capi- 
tal formation,  physical  and  human,  and  to discourage  turnover  in the low- 
wage  industries.  These  policies  would  aid in the development  of on-the-job 
training  and promotion  ladders. 
Public  service  employment.  Perhaps  because  they realize  the problems 
inherent  in government-induced  creation  of good  jobs in the private  sector, 
the dualists  stress  their creation  in the public  sector,  not just to counter 
cyclical  downturns  but as permanent  placements.  The goal is to hire and 
maintain  the structurally  unemployed  and the working  poor in a stable 
work  relationship.  Beyond  its income-equalization  effects  the appeal  of this 
policy  rests  on the notion that those locked  into the secondary  sector  are 
potentially  as productive  as primary  workers  but have been excluded  by 
institutional  barriers  or a simple scarcity  of good jobs. Also, since the 
dualists  believe  that  there  is a large  unmet  demand  for public  services  (even 
65. Ibid, pp. 60-61. 674  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
at the high wage  rate  that they recommend),  the welfare  of society  as well 
as the individuals  will be enhanced.  Secondary  workers  who lack labor 
market  endowments  will  profit  from  the specific  training  they  receive  in the 
government,  which  will furthermore  prepare  them to work  in the private 
primary  sector. 
This  proposal  runs  into the same  basic  objection  as others  do: there  is no 
evidence  to support  the  contention  that  secondary  workers  have  the  endow- 
ments  to qualify  for primary  jobs. In addition,  if this proposal  were  imple- 
mented,  it might  never  become  known  whether  secondary  workers  do in- 
deed qualify.  As an employer  of last resort,  the government  is unlikely  to 
fire  those who did not produce  and might  not worry  about  price-induced 
decreases  in the demand  for public services.  Indeed,  if it so desired,  the 
government  could absorb  the entire  adult  pool of public  assistance  bene- 
ficiaries  and the unemployed  into its work  force. Since  government  value 
added  is, by convention,  measured  by the wage  bill, gross  national  product 
would rise accordingly.  Furthermore,  the internal  labor markets  of the 
various  levels  of government,  ruled  by a combination  of civil  service  proce- 
dures  and political  patronage,  probably  conform  more  to the dualist  view 
than do those in the private  sector. Essentially,  managers  in the public 
sector  are  subject  to the same  nonmaximizing  motives  as private  managers 
and are free from some of their  constraints. 
Public  service  employment  would  have some appeal  if the government 
could  train  secondary  workers  and  then  release  them  into  the  private  sector. 
But that is unlikely  if workers  are integrated  into the civil service  and not 
compartmentalized  into a training  program.  Once  these workers  began to 
move up the civil service promotion  ladders,  which are dominated  by 
seniority,  most would  find  the entry  rates  at private  firms  unattractive.  The 
labor force trends  expected  in the late 1970s and 1980s argue strongly 
against  locking  young  workers  into public  service  jobs that are created  in 
an effort  to expand  the number  of good jobs rather  than the volume  of 
public  services. 
In addition,  government  job creation  of this sort  may also create  serious 
horizontal  inequities.  Since the government  is a high-wage  employer,  the 
wages  paid  those workers  chosen  to participate  would  leapfrog  over  those 
of other  secondary  workers  and even  those of many  in the large  gray  area 
that  lies between  the pure  secondary  and primary  sectors.  Welfare  benefits 
and  manpower  training,  on the other  hand,  move  the poor  upward  relative 
to the nonpoor,  but do not cause  significant  changes  in the ordinal  ranking 
of families  in the income  distribution.  Under  government  creation  of jobs Michael  L. Wachter  675 
an important  political  issue would arise about which secondary  workers 
would  earn  the monopoly  (wage)  rents  and  which  would  remain  in or near 
poverty.66 
Finally,  a serious  unresolved  question  is whether  the government  can 
expand  permanent  public  service  jobs, without  increasing  inflation  or de- 
creasing  private  employment,  when  the economy  is at full employment.67 
The political outlook.  Current  public service programs  have little in 
common with the dualist proposals:  they are basically countercyclical; 
and they do not have the specific  goal of hiring  only secondary  workers 
(rather  than  unemployed  primary  ones).  Especially  for programs  run  at the 
state  and local levels,  political  considerations  assure  that secondary  work- 
ers  are  rarely  jumped  in the income  distribution  past  other  workers.  Hence, 
the "trickling  down"  of benefits  to the lowest-skilled  groups,  a traditional 
feature  of economic  growth  in the private  sector,  is a likely outcome  of 
these programs.  The dualist  policy of moving  secondary  workers  directly 
into primary  jobs is more likely to result  from adjudicated  cases of dis- 
crimination  than from current  legislative  programs.68 
OTHER POLICY  OPTIONS 
If the prescriptions  of legislating  high wages and of permanent  public 
service  employment  are rejected,  the remaining  policy tools for creating 
more good  jobs are  manpower  training,  which  rests  on the older  analytical 
framework  of human  capital  formation,  and aggregate  demand  policies. 
66. The government  could circumvent  this problem either by paying wages only 
slightly  above those received  in the secondary  sector or by hiring  workers  from the gray 
areas  between  the prototype  primary  and dual sectors.  Both of these remedies,  however, 
fail to meet the original  objectives  of the dualists  for public  service  employment  oriented 
toward  the poverty  group. This objection  precludes  the guaranteed  public employment 
proposals  that offer  job guarantees  at a wage only slightly above the public assistance 
level. See, for example,  Arnold  H. Packer,  "Categorical  Public  Employment  Guarantees: 
A Proposed Solution to the Poverty Problem,"  in Studies  in Public Welfare,  Paper 9 
(Pt. 1), pp. 68-127. 
67. Most of the overall in-depth studies of public service employment  have had 
pessimistic  conclusions,  especially  for permanent  public programs.  Part of the problem 
is in project design, but important  conceptual issues exist as well. See, for example, 
Laurence  S. Seidman,  "The Design of Federal Employment  Programs:  An Economic 
Analysis" (Ph.D.  dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1974); and Alan 
Fechter,  "Public  Employment  Programs:  An Evaluative  Study,"  Working  Paper  963-41 
(Urban Institute,  September  1974). 
68. See the Supreme  Court ruling in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and subsequent 
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I omit discussion  of antidiscrimination  laws, since  the only disagreements 
about  them  concern  implementation. 
Manpower  training  policies can be divided  into two categories:  those 
that are  and  those  that are  not tied to on-the-job  training  in private  firms. 
The  distinction  then  is based  on whether  the  training  program  leads  directly 
to placement  in a "good"  job. I would argue  that subsidies  and taxes to 
encourage  firms  to undertake  specific  and on-the-job  training  or to reduce 
turnover  are  justified  on the grounds  of external  effects  inherent  in specific 
training  and the social  costs of turnover.  Such  a policy would  be difficult 
to administer,  and slow to work  because  it requires  the adoption  of new 
production  techniques.  Whatever  its flaws,  this policy seems analytically 
promising  and avoids  the ill side effects  of legislating  higher  wages.  Nor 
should policymakers  be discouraged  by the delay in the desired  effects: 
structural  problems,  almost  by definition,  have no quick  solution. 
As far as the dualists  are  concerned,  however,  the policy  of encouraging 
human  (as well as physical)  capital  formation  is not by itself satisfactory, 
since its income distribution  effects  do not assuredly  favor the lower in- 
come classes.  The growth  of either  human  or physical  capital  could con- 
ceivably  (depending  upon the program  and key parameters  such as the 
elasticity  of substitution  among  factors)  increase  the income  dispersion  by 
lowering  the basic wage of untrained  workers  or increasing  the share of 
property  income.  To the dualists,  the narrowing  of the income distribu- 
tion is as important  a goal as is the correction  of structural  problems.69 
As mentioned  above, however, some of them are prepared  to  accept 
"technological  upgrading"  as long as it is part of a policy package  con- 
sisting  of sharply  higher  minimum  wages  and measures  geared  to protect 
employment  levels.  In recommending  extensive  government  planning  and 
controls  in the secondary  sector,  the dualists  appear  to view  this sector  as 
fitting  the mold of J. K. Galbraith's  "new  industrial  state."70 
The  second  category  of manpower  training,  the more  traditional  govern- 
ment-run  programs,  has been sharply  criticized  by the dualists  as ineffec- 
tive.  In my view,  this conclusion  is subject  to question.  The dualist  dichot- 
69. Lester  C. Thurow  discusses  this point in "Redistributional  Aspects of Manpower 
Training  Programs,"  in Ulman (ed.), Manpower  Programs  in the Policy Mix. He states 
"there  is only one rationale  left for current  manpower  programs.  They must be designed 
to alter the distribution  of earned  income ...  and not simply to raise the incomes of 
low-income  workers"  (pp. 84-85). 
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omy of good and bad jobs hampers  their evaluation  of such programs. 
Manpower  training  does  not achieve  its aim  in large  jumps  in short  courses. 
It upgrades  secondary  workers  a step at a time,  so that they can fill better 
jobs in the secondary  sector  or jobs in the gray  area  between  the primary 
and secondary  sectors.71  The training  programs  should  be expected  to re- 
quire  considerable  time, especially  if it is necessary  to overcome  feedback 
effects.72  Also, manpower  training  is a complex business  whose success 
depends  crucially  on how well  the programs  are  constructed  and  funded- 
elements  that have  yet to be defined,  despite  some successes.  Design  itself, 
then,  is a time-consuming  process.  This  is also true  for on-the-job  training 
that aims at the creation  of good jobs in the private  sector-the "private 
school"  equivalent  of the "public  school"  of manpower  training.  Still,  even 
given the complexities,  I would argue  that government-sponsored  man- 
power  training-especially  on the job in the private  sector-is  preferable 
to the superficially  quick "solution"  offered  by permanent  public  service 
employment  and legislating  higher  wages. 
Second,  traditional  aggregate  demand  policies  may be more promising 
than the dual literature  implies.  Specifically,  what  the dualists  view as the 
general  inability  (except  at increasing  rates  of inflation)  of monetary  and 
fiscal  policies  to reach  secondary  workers  directly  may reflect  instead  the 
special  increase  in structural  unemployment  of secondary  workers  in the 
sixties.  Where  changing  demographic  patterns  made  demand  management 
more  difficult  in those  years,  they may,  in the next  several  years,  be such  as 
to enable  aggregate  demand  policies  to lower the overall  unemployment 
rate. 
Aggregate  demand  policies  that recognize  the changing  characteristics 
of the labor  market  and set reasonable,  noninflationary  targets,  are a cru- 
cial component  of any policy  aimed  at eliminating  the low-wage  problem. 
Although  demand  policies  may not be able to increase  the real wages of 
many secondary  workers  directly,  except  at the cost of accelerating  infla- 
tion, they should  over time be able to do so indirectly.  Economic  growth 
and capital  accumulation,  associated  with periods  of stable  and high de- 
mand,  are  the single  most crucial  ingredient  in providing  more  good  jobs. 
71. The dualists'  position on the ineffectiveness  of manpower  training  is also based 
on their  view  that more  good  jobs will not be created  in the private  sector  even  if training 
programs  create more good workers,  and that secondary  workers  already  have enough 
human  capital to be employed  in good jobs. 
72. The feedback  effects also suggest that policies be targeted  at individuals  before 
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The near-term outlook on this front, however, is bleak. The current deep 
recession and the considerable outflow of real resources to the OPEC cartel 
will considerably hinder progress in reducing poverty. 
Transfer payments are an alternative to job creation, to the extent that 
they are politically and socially acceptable as a substitute for wage income. 
Since nearly 40 percent of the low-income families have no wage earner and 
since the skill upgrading of the low-income workers will take time, transfer 
payments will continue to play an important part in antipoverty efforts. 
Although these payments have disincentive effects, such as increasing em- 
ployment instability, they are indispensable. As noted above, government 
transfer programs have led  to  significant income gains for low-income 
families over the past decade. Demographic trends toward smaller families 
and fewer young families are likely to extend these gains over the long run, 
although the near-term trend is uncertain. 
Conclusions 
This paper yields several conclusions. 
First, with respect to the primary sector, the dual literature has revived 
interest in the internal labor market. While the dualists interpret the in- 
ternal labor market as operating largely without regard to  efficiency, I 
suggest a different interpretation: it is best viewed as an efficient institu- 
tional response by firms to the basic market imperfections arising from the 
costs of information and of specific and on-the-job training. In this con- 
text, the dualist notion that primary firms fail to alter their job structure  in 
response to the relative availability or price of labor with various levels of 
skill seems unlikely. Even an efficient internal labor market, however, will 
not solve externality problems, and the number of "good" jobs tends to be 
less than a social optimum. Hence, traditional issues such as the underin- 
vestment in specific training by firms and workers arise as social problems 
that do require remedial action. 
Second, a strict dualist division between primary and secondary sectors 
is not supported by the data. Mobility between the two sectors exists and 
the wage structure shows no evidence of bipolarization. Perhaps most im- 
portant, however, is that although the institutional arrangements differ 
between structured  (primary) and unstructured  (secondary) labor markets, 
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behavior in the two sectors differs. The data do suggest the existence of 
segmented markets with imperfect mobility, arising from human capital 
constraints as well as the barriers that the dualists emphasize. The seg- 
mented-market approach, however, has a long and established position in 
neoclassical economics. 
The dualist view of pervasive underemployment in the secondary sector 
is empirically unproven and, indeed, may not be testable. It remains an 
article of faith that workers in the secondary sector are potentially skilled 
enough to function in the primary sector (given the usual training costs) 
but are prevented by discrimination, imperfect information, and the failure 
of primary firms to adjust their  job structure  in response to the availability 
of good workers. Given the paucity of supporting evidence thus far, the 
dualist hypothesis does  not  provide a  serious challenge to  the  human 
capital explanation. Nonetheless,  the  dualist model  is  a  successful and 
innovative line of inquiry when evaluated as an empirical description of 
the workings of the lowest wage sectors in a traditional segmented model. 
In addition, the dualists improve over most neoclassical models by intro- 
ducing feedback effects into their model, although the implications of these 
effects are not fully integrated. The feedback hypothesis, an important con- 
cept in sociological and psychological models, views workers as altering 
behavioral patterns (that is, undergoing shifts in tastes or preferences) in 
response to external stimuli. For example, secondary workers adopt un- 
stable work patterns as a consequence of distaste for low-wage, dead-end 
jobs. They then become unacceptable for employment in the primary sec- 
tor, and, in a meaningful sense, inferior to primary workers-contrary  to 
the dualist unemployment hypothesis that workers in the two sectors are 
largely indistinguishable in their skills, human capital, and the like. 
Third, the dual evidence on unemployment of secondary workers has 
made  an  important contribution to  understanding the  unemployment 
mechanism. Secondary workers have an unstable attachment to particular 
jobs and to labor force participation in general. Low wages, job instability, 
and frequent short spells of unemployment provide the ingredients for the 
policy problem posed by the working poor. The dualists argue that this 
type of unemployment, with its associated poverty complications, is un- 
responsive to aggregate demand policies except at accelerating rates of in- 
flation. But the dualist evidence is drawn from cross-section observations 
and ignores the changing demographic composition of unemployment, a 
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monetary and fiscal policy was hampered during the late 1960s and early 
1970s by a rise in the structural component of unemployment, but may 
face a more amenable situation within the next few years. 
Fourth, the dualist solution to the joint problem of poverty and unem- 
ployment is to create more good jobs, mainly by legislating higher wages 
in the secondary sector or by establishing permanent public service jobs 
at primary wage scales for secondary workers. I argue that this approach 
amounts largely to the creation of more monopoly rent and will not solve 
the structural problems. The dualist policies geared to removing barriers 
through antidiscrimination laws, although certainly not novel, are more 
likely to have the desired effect. Furthermore, the general strategy of cre- 
ating more good  jobs  appears promising. However,  my  recommended 
course would be oriented toward manpower training, either in the form of 
government-run training programs or by encouraging the private sector 
(through subsidies or taxes) to  expand on-the-job training. The income 
distribution effects of  the dual program should be  achieved, if desired, 
through government transfer payments and not by legislating high wages. 
Finally, the dual model does not provide an overall theory of the labor 
market. It does, however, stress factors, especially of an institutional na- 
ture, that have been ignored by most neoclassical economists. As such, the 
dual literature is a rich and provocative set of loosely connected empirical 
hypotheses about labor market behavior. I argue, however, that its novel 
empirical findings can be integrated into a traditional model and indeed 
are more easily understood in such a context. Comments  and 
Discussion 
R. A. Gordon: Wachter has presented a useful review of a substantial part 
of the recent, burgeoning literature on the dual labor market. The aim of 
the survey-which  is not  unsympathetic to  a loose  and flexible version 
of the dual hypothesis-is  not  only to  review the literature but also to 
demonstrate that the findings that emerge from it can be fitted into a neo- 
classical framework. After all, Alfred Marshall-and  Cairnes before him- 
had a theory of noncompeting groups. 
Wachter deliberately  refrains  from considering any of the relevant litera- 
ture from the radical school of economics. This is understandable,  particu- 
larly given the limitations of time and space. The result, however, is inade- 
quate attention to  some important dimensions of the range of problems 
implied by the concept of a dual labor market-particularly  how the rele- 
vant institutional environment has evolved and how its interaction with 
the factors stressed by  orthodox economists creates the problems with 
which the literature on the dual labor market deals. 
Wachter draws several significant conclusions from his analysis. First, 
he says, the dual theory does not provide an overall model of the labor 
market. This is certainly true. I also agree with the author, however, that 
the literature that he surveys does provide a "rich and provocative" set of 
hypotheses that need to be pursued. 
Second, Wachter challenges the argument that internal labor markets 
are not dominated by efficiency considerations. In his words, the internal 
labor market is "an efficiency-oriented  institutional response to the market 
forces generated by idiosyncratic jobs  and the technology of  on-the-job 
training." This statement-rather  a mouthful-covers  a lot of ground. I am 
prepared to  agree that "efficiency considerations" (if we can settle on a 
definition of that term) do affect job  design, promotion criteria, and in- 
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ternal wage  structures. But  what  are the  institutional constraints that 
govern the manner in which these efficiency considerations are applied? 
How did these constraints evolve? And to what extent are they subject to 
change? 
In my own work, I have been impressed by the relatively low unemploy- 
ment rates in some sectors of the primary  labor market and by the need to 
redesign  jobs and to alter promotion and seniority patterns  to provide more 
good jobs for those now on the fringes of the primary labor market. The 
obstacles to doing so are not the "inefficiency," in a loose sense, of em- 
ployers, but  rather inertia, lack  of  information, and a  wide variety of 
institutional constraints. 
Wachter concludes that the data do not support a strict dualist division 
between primary and secondary sectors. Strictly speaking, this is certainly 
true. On the other hand, it is also true that the total labor market is divided 
into sectors, among which mobility is restricted. The labor force can be 
classified in a variety of ways, depending on which of its dimensions are to 
be emphasized. Demographic characteristics-age,  sex, and color-have 
been the focus of the recent literature. If these dimensions are used, it is 
perhaps not inaccurate to refer to wage distributions that have distinctly 
different central tendencies-but  that do overlap. 
What bothers me most  about the strict dual market approach is  its 
tendency to lump nonwhites, teenagers, and women into one presumably 
homogeneous  labor force,  to  which the  same set  of  institutional con- 
straints applies. All three of these overlapping segments of the labor force 
undeniably suffer from one  or another type of  discrimination (whether 
conscious or unconscious); and none of them can become white, prime-age 
males (except for white teenagers in the customary course of time). But 
each of these groups enters the labor market with different handicaps of 
different origins; the distribution of human capital is different for each, 
and so is the distribution of employment by occupation and industry. 
According to Wachter, advocates of the dual market hypothesis do not 
integrate feedback effects into their models. They do not, in other words, 
take adequate account of the extent to which and the ways in which the 
conditions of work impair the ability of secondary workers to qualify for 
primary  jobs. The truth of this observation depends on the author one is 
citing. 
My  main point  in  this  connection  is  that  Wachter does  not  go  far 
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the conditions of work in the secondary  job market-to  family background 
and neighborhood, housing conditions, the cultural environment during 
the preschool and school years, and so on. And here again, the relevant 
secondary workers do not form a homogeneous group. This "institutional 
conditioning" is far different, for example, for black teenagers in urban 
ghettoes than for middle-class married white women reentering the labor 
force. 
Another conclusion of Wachter's analysis is that what he terms "the 
structural component of  unemployment" will decline in the rest of  the 
seventies, presumably and primarily because the teenagers of the recent 
past and the present will be becoming prime-age adults. I agree with that 
prediction, and previously stated it,  as Wachter notes. But he does not 
mention that the percentage of white males age 35-64 in the labor force 
will continue to decline through the rest of the decade. What effect will that 
have on wage inflation and on wage and unemployment differentials  (par- 
ticularly with respect to young adult males) during this period? 
Finally, in the area of policy solutions, Wachter emphasizes the need for 
manpower training-both  on-the-job training programs subsidized by the 
government and programs administered directly by the government. He 
has little to say about the mixed results of the training programs of the last 
decade-about  recent experience with the  JOBS program or about the 
reluctance of large-scale employers to endure the paper work involved in 
applying for federal subsidies. Given the external pressures that they have 
felt, they have preferred  to engage in their own "outreach" programs, to 
"cream off" the top, and then to forget about it when labor market condi- 
tions eased. Furthermore, Wachter makes no mention of the possible re- 
sults of the 1973 legislation that shifts the responsibility for training pro- 
grams to state and local governments. 
One final comment. Wachter is not sympathetic to public service em- 
ployment as even a partial solution to the problem created by the existence 
of  a  secondary labor market.  "Leakages"-the  substitution of  federal 
subsidies for employees at the state and local level who otherwise would 
be financed out of state and local revenues-are  a problem that cannot 
be ignored. But, with adequate legislative and administrative safeguards, 
it can be controlled. Perhaps for no better reason than early involvement 
in the cause, I continue to support what I have termed a "two-tier" pro- 
gram  of  public  service employment-a  permanent, underlying tier  of 
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cyclical program to  deal with the rising unemployment that emerges in 
recessions like the present one. 
Michael J. Piore:  I have had considerable trouble in attempting to respond 
to Michael Wachter's paper. My problems spring, I think, in large measure 
from the paper itself. Essentially, it undertakes  a threefold task: to identify 
a common core in the writings about dual labor markets; to distinguish 
the points at which that common core conflicts with neoclassical theory; 
and finally, to assay and if possible resolve that conflict. Given the dis- 
parate writings on dualism and (the rhetoric notwithstanding) the implicit 
nature of much of the conflict with orthodox theory, Wachter has set him- 
self no easy task, and it is not surprising  that the paper fails. Nonetheless, 
I think Wachter is basically right in his presumption of a set of common 
themes in the "dualist" work and of their fundamental conflict with ortho- 
dox professional thinking. Those themes, moreover, appear very disturbing 
to  neoclassical labor economics-much  more disturbing, I  must admit 
candidly, than the quality of the work seems by itself to warrant. And it 
seems to me that Wachter's paper, whatever its failings in articulating the 
conflict, comes closer to catching the spirit of the underlying issues than 
most contributions to this debate. For these reasons, I shall respond to 
what I think the paper is trying to say rather than to precisely what it does 
say. I want to make three points: one about evidence, one about theory, 
and one about policy. In order not to confuse the issue further, I will speak 
in the first person, although on much of this I do not necessarily speak for 
myself alone. 
On  evidence:  The first  point  I want  to discuss  is the interpretation  of the 
efforts to test the dual hypothesis  econometrically.  The analytical  con- 
structs  of the dual labor market  and the internal  labor market  represent 
attempts  to capture  the conception  that the actors in the labor market 
themselves  have of the world  in which  they operate.  These  concepts  derive 
from  open-ended  interviews  with  the actors  and  from  the experience  of the 
researchers  themselves  in various  projects  and programs.  Many  of the fea- 
tures  of the internal  labor  market,  and some of the dual  labor  market,  are 
also  written  in legislation,  court  opinions,  collective  bargaining  agreements, 
arbitration  awards,  and the like. All of this is evidence,  if not the kind 
normally  admitted  in the court of economics.  For those of us who have 
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I, for one, am not about to dismiss  any of the constructs  simply  because 
econometric  evidence  fails to support  it. 
I do not want  to ignore  the econometric  evidence;  but I am much  more 
likely to infer from that evidence  that I got the structure  wrong or that 
they got me wrong than that the labor market  structures  I have talked 
about  have  no reality  and do not require  an explanation.  Often  the econo- 
metric  evidence  is made  the central  issue  in debates  on this area  (although 
it is by no means  unambiguous  taken even on its own terms).  It is also 
raised  in Wachter's  paper  but it is not, I think,  really  an issue  between  us. 
I don't  think  we would  have  any  real  difficulty  agreeing  on what  exists  and 
what  needs  to be explained.  Our  disagreement  is really  theoretical. 
On theory:  The theoretical  issue is a subtle  one and it is fundamental. 
I do not know whether  I can present  it clearly,  but I am going  to try. The 
issue  is one of where  and how  one looks for explanations  of the structures 
that  the dual  labor  market  and  the internal  labor  market  contain.  Wachter 
has been looking  for these  explanations  in "information"  and "training." 
I have  been looking  for them,  in addition,  in the processes  through  which 
technology  develops  and  changes  and in the interaction  between  economic 
processes  and  worker  preferences  (or tastes).  The thrust  of my approach  is 
to make  both technology  and tastes  integral  parts  of the economic  process 
and to understand  labor  market  structure  as the product  of that integra- 
tion. 
Part  of our  differences  can be traced  to the difference  between  "informa- 
tion"  and "training,"  on the one hand,  and "technology"  and "tastes,"  on 
the other,  within  the neoclassical  framework.  Neoclassical  theory  is essen- 
tially a story  about a world  in which  technology  and tastes  are given.  As 
soon as one tries  to build  into an economic  model  a process  that generates 
technology  and tastes,  one goes beyond  neoclassical  theory.  That story  is 
then no longer  central  to the understanding  of economic  activity,  and, in 
the sense  that theoretical  disputes  basically  involve  what should  be made 
"central,"  a fundamental  antagonism  develops. Such an antagonism  is 
manifested  by Wachter's  concern with efficiency.  His text, however,  is 
somewhat  misleading  on this score.  I am not arguing  that  the firm  operates 
inefficiently  and certainly  not that management  fails to minimize  cost. 
However,  when  tastes  and technology  are made  endogenous  to the econ- 
omy,  the term  "efficiency,"  as it is understood  in neoclassical  theory,  loses 
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for the neoclassical  model and, in that sense, the labor market  structure 
can be efficient  in Wachter's  view  of the world  in a way  that  it cannot  be in 
mine. 
Our  disagreements,  however,  are  really  more  fundamental  than  this, for 
they concern  not only where  one looks for an explanation  but how one 
looks. Wachter's  approach  has been  to treat  "information"  and "training" 
essentially  as commodities  with a carefully  limited number  of peculiar 
properties.  These commodities  are then introduced  into the neoclassical 
model,  and the model  adjusted  to their  peculiarities.  With  luck (or proper 
selection of the properties  of the commodities),  the essential orthodox 
model survives.  In this, Wachter  is following  the thrust  of contemporary 
economic  theory,  not only  at Chicago  but at more  mathematically  oriented 
schools  as well.  If there  is a difference,  it is that  the institutions  he is seeking 
to explain have eluded the tight mathematical  specification  that would 
enable  him to proceed  at the abstract  level of most contemporary  theory. 
I sympathize  with  the efforts  of Wachter,  and  of the profession  generally, 
to salvage  neoclassical  theory  in this way  (we "dualists"  are  more  aware  of 
the intellectual  mess we have made for ourselves  by departing  from the 
orthodox  framework  than our colleagues  recognize).  But I think  the effort 
is misplaced;  particularly  in labor  market  theory,  whose  motivation  springs 
from serious  policy  concerns,  it involves  a fundamental  misunderstanding 
of the nature  of neoclassical  theory  and its relation  to policy. Basically, 
neoclassical  theory  is a good story.  Even  though  technology  and tastes  are 
given, it is a very  rich story,  and it has been a particularly  rich source  of 
policy  for the control  of economic  systems.  Also, the story  has  now  been  so 
refined  that it can often  be written  in tight  mathematical  notation.  But the 
richness  of the story  is not conveyed  by its mathematical  formulation,  and 
almost all the policy insights  of neoclassical  theory are drawn  from the 
story,  not the equations. 
To meet the challenge  posed by the internal  labor  market  and the dual 
labor market-more particularly  by the concerns  about income  distribu- 
tion and social  mobility  that led to the formulation  of these  constructs- 
one must  be armed  with  a story  that  is as rich  as the neoclassical  one. And 
the attempt  to define  information  and  training  as mathematically  tractable 
commodities  that  fit  readily  into  the  neoclassical  equations  is not producing 
a story  about information  and training  rich enough  to serve  as the foun- 
tainhead  of policy.  It does  not even  offer  criteria  by which  to judge  whether 
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into neoclassical  models  make  any  sense.  Moreover,  in any complete story 
about information  and training,  I believe that both must be viewed as 
cognitive  processes.  These  processes  are,  to some  extent,  the same  as those 
involved  in the generation  of technology  and tastes, and they cannot be 
made  to fit into a model  in which  technology  and  tastes  are  exogenous.  My 
argument,  in its boldest  form,  is that the story  that will support  the model 
that  Wachter  is trying  to construct  on the basis  of information  and  training 
implies  a story about technology  and tastes as well which  is inconsistent 
with neoclassical  theory. The technology-and-tastes  story is needed for 
policy purposes  in any case, and once it is constructed,  it undermines 
Wachter's  approach,  even as a theoretical  exercise.  Of course,  to offer a 
really  compelling  argument,  I should  be able to tell you that story.  And I 
can't. But since  the dualist  debate  has so often bogged  down in a host of 
irrelevant  issues,  which  Wachter's  paper  has avoided,  I do think  it is very 
important  to emphasize  that the "story"  is the fundamental  issue. 
On policy:  In the area of policy, I believe that the paper completely 
misses the critical  consideration  in the secondary  sector in the coming 
decades:  illegal immigration.  Virtually  unnoticed,  illegal aliens have be- 
come a factor  of tremendous-and still explosively  growing-importance. 
Estimates  made  by the Immigration  and Naturalization  Service  (INS) put 
the illegal alien population  between 4 million and 12 million in 1974, 
roughly  similar  to the number  of legal aliens  in Western  European  econ- 
omies (whose position  has been compared  to that of our black popula- 
tion). The rate of increase  is suggested  by the number  of apprehensions 
by the INS: about 500,000  in 1972,  655,000  in 1973,  and 800,000  in 1974. 
The growth  in this  population  is concentrated  in urban  industrial  centers 
in the Northeast,  the Midwest,  and California. 
Illegal  aliens  constitute  a labor  force  in perpetual  fear  of disclosure.  This 
fear  exposes  them  to the worst  kind  of exploitation,  and  creates  the oppor- 
tunity  for an underground  labor  market.  The economic  incentives  for such 
a labor market  are large. In it, an employer  can escape  minimum  wage 
legislation,  legal health  and safety  standards,  social security  taxes, unem- 
ployment  insurance,  workman's  compensation,  and income  tax withhold- 
ing.  The  deterrents  to such  a labor  market  are  the heavy  penalties  that  vio- 
lations  of these statutes  carry  and, to a certain  degree,  social custom.  At 
present,  the employer  who uses alien labor incurs  no legal sanction.  The 
thrust  of most policy  proposals,  however,  is to make  the employer  respon- 
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the balance  of penalties  will change  and I see a strong  likelihood  that em- 
ployers,  having  already  violated  the law by hiring  aliens,  will violate  other 
laws to retain  them and to make the maximum  profit  out of employing 
them. 
This  discussion  suggests  that  the  concerns  of the  dualists  with  eliminating 
the secondary  sector  through  large  increases  in the minimum  wage,  public 
service  jobs, and the like are  misplaced.  The battle  of the next decade  will 
be defensive: to preserve  minimal  standards  of wages,  working  conditions, 
and  social  insurance,  and  to prevent  the secondary  sector  from  reverting  to 
the conditions  of the late nineteenth  and early  twentieth  century. 
But,  in a certain  sense,  the phenomenon  of iliegal  immigration  does  seem 
to me to support  the analysis  that  gave  rise  to such  dualist  policy  proposals. 
For analytical  purposes,  the great  mystery  of illegal  immigration  is not why 
it is occurring  now but why it failed  to occur  two or three  decades  earlier, 
when  the disparities  of income  between  the United  States  and  Latin  Amer- 
ica (from which  most of the illegal aliens are coming)  were, if anything, 
larger.  The answer  appears  to be that  the new  immigration  is a response  to 
a vacuum  in urban  industrial  labor  markets  created  by the refusal  of black 
workers,  whose parents  came from the rural  South, to accept  secondary 
jobs, and the exhaustion  of rural  labor reserves  from which  a new, more 
"docile"  black  labor  force  might  be drawn.  The movement  of the bumper 
postwar  baby  crop  out of adolescence,  which  Wachter  notes,  is aggravating 
this shortage.  The economy  is behaving,  in other  words,  as if the  job and 
wage structure  were fixed, and the labor force, one way or another-in 
this case through  immigration-gets adjusted  to it. The floor on the job 
and  wage  structure  appears  to be established  by law, and  if that  legal  floor 
had been higher,  as the dualists  wanted  to make it, jobs would probably 
have  been better.  I tend to doubt  that they would  have  been primary  jobs 
(for reasons that require  a much more extended  discussion  than I can 
undertake  here).  In any case, this evidence  certainly  does not fit an ortho- 
dox model  in which  labor  supply  is a real  constraint  and  legal  intervention 
simply  creates  unemployment.  Indeed,  in certain  respects,  it is much  more 
consistent  with a Marxian  world  that will have its subproletariat-if  not 
drawn  from  blacks  or youth, then from abroad. 
Robert  E. Hall: Michael  Wachter  has taken on the difficult  task of ap- 
praising  the rather  loosely organized  body of thought  on segmentation  of 
the labor  market.  A major  theme of his critique  is that the economics  of Michael L.  Wachter  689 
dualism  is really  just standard  "neoclassical"  economics.  I think  he over- 
states the success  of standard  economic  theory in comprehending  three 
phenomena  of direct concern to the dualists: discrimination,  bilateral 
monopoly,  and unemployment.  Discrimination  is a pervasive  and well- 
documented  feature  of labor  markets  and is central  to the dualists'  expla- 
nation of segmentation.  No neoclassical  theory  satisfactorily  explains  the 
survival  of discrimination  in the presence  of powerful  economic  forces  that 
should  undermine  it. 
Bilateral  monopoly  characterizes  the relation  of workers  and employers 
whenever  there  is human  capital  specific  to the employer.  Standard  eco- 
nomic theory  has little to say about the division  of the return  to specific 
capital  between  workers  and employers.  I think  Wachter  is correct,  how- 
ever,  in stressing  that  the institutions  of the internal  labor  market  deal  with 
bilateral  monopoly  in an economicaliy  efficient  way and are  less arbitrary 
than,  the dualists  would  have us believe. 
Finally, only recently  have standard  economic  theorists  come to grips 
with unemployment.  Their success  in explaining  the facts of unemploy- 
ment-many of them pointed  out by the dualists-is still far from com- 
plete. 
Wachter  discusses  the empirical  evidence  for segmentation  only briefly. 
He concludes,  I think  correctly,  that segmentation  exists  in the sense  that 
there  are  large,  systematic,  unexplained  differences  in earnings  among  dif- 
ferent  groups  of workers,  but that  no literal  duality  is apparent  in the data. 
To this static  view  I would  add  that  recent  studies  of mobility  between  jobs 
give no support  to the dualists'  hypothesis  that secondary  workers  become 
trapped  in bad  jobs. Among  young  workers,  movement  from  bad to good 
jobs is surprisingly  common. In this respect,  I think Wachter  takes too 
seriously  the dualists'  stereotype  of good  jobs filled  entirely  from  the inter- 
nal labor market.  The data on mobility  show frequent  movements  into 
good  jobs well above  entry  levels  via the external  labor  market. 
I disagree  with two of Wachter's  conclusions  about government  inter- 
vention  in the labor  market.  First, he finds  it inappropriate  to compel or 
induce  the hiring  of secondary  workers  into primary  jobs, where  the pri- 
mary  jobs pay  high  wages  because  of the  monopoly  power  of those  holding 
them. He argues  that such an expansion  of employment  would only add 
to monopoly  power.  Of course,  this  is true  in terms  of the number  of work- 
ers protected  by monopoly,  but the appropriate  measure  of the inequity 
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bad  jobs, which  would  narrow.  Second,  he favors  training  programs  as the 
major  tool for raising  the income  of low-wage  workers.  Evidence  accumu- 
lated since my pessimistic  paper  (BPEA, 3:1971), which  evaluated  man- 
power  programs  that operate  within  labor markets  with existing  institu- 
tions,  has not convinced  me that I was wrong.  There  is a shortage  of good 
jobs, and  merely  equipping  workers  to hold good  jobs is not enough. 
Michael  L. Wachter:  I agree  with Michael  Piore  that the endogeneity  of 
tastes  and technology  is the major  issue on which  dualist  and neoclassical 
models  diverge.  (This  is an interesting  agreement  between  us, since  to other 
dualists,  other  issues that I raise  in the paper  seem to be central.)  I also 
agree  with  Piore  that  neoclassical  economics  is to be faulted  for neglecting 
tastes and technology.  I disagree,  however,  that the dualist  "story  about 
technology  and tastes ...  is inconsistent  with neoclassical  theory."  This, 
in part,  is a definitional  issue;  to Piore,  endogenous  tastes  and technology 
seem to be defined  as nonneoclassical.  Since  Piore  admits  that the dualist 
work in this area is just beginning,  there  is no reason  to assume  that its 
ultimate  findings  will be incompatible  with  the general  thrust  of orthodox 
economic  theory.  In a sense, the results  may be able to fill the "empty 
boxes"  of taste and technology  in the neoclassical  model.' 
Specifically,  although  Piore  and others  have  made  some  useful  progress 
in understanding  tastes  and technology,  important  empirical  and theoret- 
ical questions  remain  unanswered.  For example,  what  is the dualist  posi- 
tion or evidence  on the culture-of-poverty  hypothesis?  How reversible  or 
irreversible  are  feedback  effects  in the poverty  population?  Are  these  effects 
developed  largely  before or after entry into the labor market?  Are they 
created  before  or after  entry  into elementary  school?  With  respect  to tech- 
nology,  what  are  its endogenous  determinants?  Lacking  empirical  answers 
to these questions,  dualist policy recommendations  would have to be 
viewed  as highly  preliminary. 
My impression  is that Piore  draws  too sharp  a distinction  between  my 
"information  and training"  approach  and his "tastes  and technology." 
Although  I use the former  concepts  to discuss  a broad  range  of issues,  the 
endogeneity  of tastes  and  technology  is related  to issues  about  information 
and training. 
1. For a neoclassical  treatment  of endogenous  taste change, see Robert A. Pollak, 
"Habit Formation and Dynamic Demand Functions,"  Journal  of Political Economy, 
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I am very  sympathetic  to Piore's  concerns  that attempts  to build  mathe- 
matical  rigor into neoclassical  models often leads to highly generalized 
models  with untestable  or uninteresting  hypotheses.  I am also concerned, 
however,  that the desire  of the dualists  to create  a rich story  has led them 
to an approach  that  may  be too descriptive  to suggest  testable  hypotheses. 
I should  also like to respond  briefly  to Robert  Hall's  comments.  I agree 
with him that manpower  policies have not generally  been successful  to 
date;  but  I am  still  hopeful  that,  with  better  design  and  administration,  such 
training,  especially  if done on the job, can become more successful.  In 
addition,  as my paper  makes  clear,  I agree  that  there  is a shortage  of good 
jobs. It does not follow, however,  that "equipping  workers  to hold good 
jobs is not enough."  For I see a shortage  of good workers  as well as good 
jobs, and believe that, if manpower  training  programs  are successful  in 
creating  "good workers,"  the labor market  will adjust  to the change in 
relative  factor  availability. 
General  Discussion 
Marina  Whitman  started  an extended  discussion  by asking  for a defini- 
tion of a "good  job" in dual theory.  Michael  Piore  listed several  charac- 
teristics:  high wages,  good working  conditions,  opportunities  for advance- 
ment,  a structured  relationship  with  supervisors-all of which  bear on the 
stability  of the  job. At Stephen  Magee's  suggestion,  Piore  conceded  that a 
sizable  endowment  of human  capital  might  also belong on the list. 
The list reinforced  Whitman's  belief that a good job is defined  by its 
rewards,  and not by its function;  thus,  garbage  collecting  could  be a good 
job. Piore  suggested  that, if the wage of a job is high, the other  favorable 
characteristics  would  ordinarily  follow,  as employers  and  employees  adjust 
to the pay. Wachter  and Robert  Dorfman  did not believe  that Piore's  job 
characteristics  would  neatly  divide  jobs into "good"  and "bad."  Dorfman 
pointed  to two examples  of high-wage  jobs with bad-job  characteristics: 
longshoremen  with  unstable  work,  and  auto  production  workers  who  com- 
plain of bad working  conditions.  Dorfman  also wondered  whether  some 
allegedly  secondary  jobs were not really "exploratory"  jobs for young 
people  who outgrew  them with  maturity. 
Arthur  Okun  attributed  many  aspects  of the partitioned  labor  market  to 
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a long-term  contract.  A firm will not invest in a worker  to the socially 
optimum  extent  because  it cannot  be sure  of capturing  the benefits  of the 
investment.  Given  this market  failure,  employers  have two basic options: 
(1) to invest  in workers  and seek to develop  lasting  attachments  through 
tenure,  promotion,  pensions,  and the like; or (2) not to train  workers  and 
thus to tolerate  the high turnover  of "bad  jobs." Piore said Okun's  ap- 
proach  might  explain  the existence  of different  labor  markets,  but not how 
the different  markets  operate.  Wachter  felt that the dual theory  does not 
provide  this explanation  either. 
Charles  Holt said  that  most  empirical  studies  support  a segmented  labor 
market,  but not a simple,  two-part  market.  Edward  Erickson  reported  on 
evidence  that  the  high  wages  of concentrated  industries  could  be explained, 
at least in part,  by the high capital  intensity  of production  in these  indus- 
tries  and  the complementarity  of skill  and  capital  intensity,  without  appeal- 
ing to either  nonneoclassical  or monopoly  elements. 
There  was some  disagreement  about  the role of labor  unions  in the dual 
labor market.  Hendrik  Houthakker  felt that some scarcity  of good jobs 
was attributable  to labor unions and some to monopolistic  restrictions 
(including  those in regulated  industries  like trucking)  that operate  directly 
on product  markets.  Robert  Hall  reiterated  his point  that  opening  up union 
jobs reduces  the  monopoly  power  of particular  unions.  Wachter  questioned 
the relevance  of Hall's  point  in an economy  in which  many  workers  cannot 
forcibly  be organized  into strong  unions  due to the nature  of the relevant 
product  and  labor  markets.  Piore  emphasized  that  labor  unions  need  to be 
considered  a result  of the  system  (and  to be encompassed  by an endogenous 
theory)  as well as a force operating  on the system. 
Stephen  Marston  discussed  the role of income  maintenance  programs, 
such  as unemployment  insurance  and  welfare,  in dual  labor  theories.  Dual- 
ists cite these  programs  in explaining  why unemployment  can coexist  with 
numerous  vacancies  in  jobs that  are  considered  bad.  Yet the dualists  do not 
discuss  the possibility  of reforming  the programs  of income  maintenance 
in order  to increase  attachment  in these  jobs and reduce  unemployment. 
Dorfman  thought  the discussion  of discrimination  in dual theory  casts 
the issue  in a narrowly  American  context.  He and  Franco  Modigliani  won- 
dered whether  the same patterns  exist in countries  with a much more 
homogeneous  labor force, like Sweden. Information  along these lines 
might  throw  light  on the influence  of discrimination  in U.S. labor  markets. 
Unlike  Hall, Holt and Wachter  were  not willing  to write  off manpower Michael L.  Wachter  693 
programs.  They  insisted  that the programs  that have  been tried  have  been 
crude  and  do not necessarily  illuminate  the true  possibilities  of training  and 
job matching.  Holt suggested,  for example,  that  the Employment  Service's 
current  information  on jobs is very  "thin,"  stressing  detailed  occupational 
distinctions  but  omitting  other  key  dimensions.  Both  Wachter  and  Erickson 
cited studies that showed some net benefits  from particular  manpower 
training  programs. 